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ABSTRACT 
LARRY DOUGLAS MELTON: Employees’ Choice of Health Benefits and Its Effect on Utilization and 
Third-Party Payments 
(Under the direction of Sandra Greene) 
Despite the popularity of Preferred-Provider Organizations (PPOs) in the employer-
sponsored market, it is still unclear from the literature whether the adoption of the PPO cost-
containment design is able to reduce employer coverage costs and efficiently manage 
employees’ health services utilization relative to other plan designs. The objective of this 
research is to examine the effect of three PPO benefit designs on health services use and 
third-party payments compared to an Indemnity design, controlling for non-random selection.  
A by product of examining benefit design is observing predictors of health plan selection. All 
four plans in this study offered the exact same provider network and only differed in their 
out-of-pocket (OOP) cost-sharing requirements. To address the potential bias resulting from 
the endogenous health insurance choice, a two-stage residual inclusion equation is applied 
which allows for a consistent estimate of the effect of the PPOs. Of the four plans available, 
the PPO Standard was the most frequently selected plan (60%), followed by the PPO Plus 
(14%), PPO Basic (4%), and Indemnity (12%). Regression results showed the PPOs with the 
highest-cost sharing requirements, Standard ($3,032) and Basic ($2,862), had lower predicted 
total third-party payments than the Indemnity ($3,955) plan (p<0.05).  The differences in the 
PPOs’ predicted total third-party payments compared to the Indemnity’s payment total was 
consistent across family health statuses and dependent coverage type. Also, inpatient and 
office utilization totals were greater in the Plus and Indemnity plans compared to the Bas ic  
 
 
iii 
and Standard plans’ utilization totals (p<0.05). The Basic and Standard plans’ effect on third-
party payments demonstrates that the higher cost-sharing PPOs are likely to produce more 
employer cost savings than an Indemnity plan with similarly high, cost-sharing requirements. 
The higher utilization totals in the low cost-sharing plans, and the lower utilization totals in 
the high cost-sharing plans, suggest that members’ price sensitivity to the cost-sharing 
requirements is likely influencing their level of health services use. This finding is consistent 
with previous insurance literature showing that the type of health plan cost-sharing 
arrangement has a positive effect on the use of services and total expenditures. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
A. Overall Purpose of Study 
 
The North Carolina (NC) State Employees  and Teachers’ Health Plan (SEHP)  covers 
649,000 state employees, including teachers, retirees, lawmakers, state university and 
community college personnel, state hospital staff, and their dependents (NC SEHP, 2007). 
Prior to October of 2006, NC SEHP offered employees a single traditional Indemnity 
insurance plan. In October of 2006, three additional Preferred-Provider Organizations (PPOs) 
plans were made available to state employees. The NC General Assembly approved the PPO 
offerings to give state employees more plan choices and because the Indemnity plan was a 
more expensive form of providing insurance coverage by commercial market standards 
(SEHP, 2007). PPOs are distinct in that they are plans that offer enrollees access to a 
contracted network of providers and out-of-pocket (OOP) incentives to use that network.  In 
contrast, most Indemnity plans follow a fee- for-service payment structure and often lack the 
contracted discounts available to enrollees that obtain health services from in-network 
providers (Hurley et al, 2004).The four plans presented by the NC SEHP in 2006 offered the 
same provider network, but the four plans differed by their range of cost-sharing 
requirements (this includes premiums, co-payments and deductibles). The choice then for 
state employees was selecting the type of OOP cost-sharing arrangement they believed best 
suited their health coverage needs.  
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The dissertation objective is to examine the pure treatment effect of benefit design on 
total health services utilization and total third-party payments, controlling for non-
random selection. Results from this study will provide new empirical evidence on how 
tiered PPO benefits effect employee utilization and employer coverage costs in a 
privately insured, state employee population. Previously published studies on the effect 
of PPO benefit design on utilization and costs have been conducted on employer groups 
from private firms and federal agencies (Chernew, Frick, and McLaughlin, 1997; 
Stromom and Buchmueller, 2002; Gruber and Washington, 2005). However, less is 
known about PPO plans’ effect on utilization and costs to state employees in the context 
of a state employee health plan. We extend the knowledge base by (1) predicting state 
employee characteristics associated with a greater probability of PPO selection, relative 
to an alternative design, and then (2) estimating the effects of the PPO benefit on 
utilization and costs for a privately insured state employee population.  
This work is of national policy importance to all state employee health plans 
interested in further understanding employee choice and the effects of benefit design 
following a change in benefit offerings. State employee populations are important to 
study because state employee health plans insured 3.4 million state employees in 2002; 
and the total number of insured grew to 4.5 million people when including counts of 
dependents covered (Kaiser, 2003). State employees and their dependents represent a 
large portion of the U.S. insured population, yet very few analyses have exclusively 
analyzed employee choice and the effect of a change in benefits in a state employee 
population (Burns et al, 2004; Parente et al, 2004). Given that 47 out of the 50 state 
employee health plans have added at least one new product PPO product since 2006, this 
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study will produce timely evidence that state policymakers can use in future decision-
making around coverage options.  
        Empirically, this study will provide another application of the two-stage residual 
inclusion (2SRI) framework to address the endogeneity of health insurance in non- linear 
models. There are only a few studies in the health econometric literature that have 
estimated the treatment effect of an endogenous insurance variable using the 2SRI 
instrumental variable (IV) method in the non- linear context. Partha Deb and colleagues 
published a study that employed 2SRI to address selection bias in an explanatory 
insurance variable that was multinomial in nature (Deb et al, 2006). Terza and colleagues 
used a generic parametric framework to show that 2SRI is the only consistent IV 
estimator in non- linear models (Terza et al, 2008). Given that our study seeks to address 
the endogeneity of health insurance in non- linear models, we will use the best available 
method for IV estimation in non- linear models. 
 
 
B.  Overall Specific Aims 
 
The first aim of the study is to measure the extent to which adverse selection drove 
plan choice in the first year multiple PPO options were available. The goal of aim one is 
to measure the observable characteristics of SEHP members’ effect on the probability of 
selecting one of the three PPO plans or remaining in the Indemnity plan. The study 
specifically focused on the relationship between enrollees’ prior year health services 
utilization totals and their health plan choice for the 2006 to 2007 coverage period. We 
hypothesized that members’ choice of plans in 2006 will be based on their prior year 
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utilization totals.  A conditional logit model was used to estimate the probability of health 
plan selection given members’ prior year utilization total and other covariates.  
The second aim will determine the effect of PPO benefit design on SEHP members’ 
total inpatient and office utilization, controlling for non-random selection. The objective 
of aim two is to estimate the pure treatment effect of benefit design on inpatient and 
office utilization, separate from that which is due to self-selection. We sought to obtain 
the effect of each of the three PPO benefit designs on utilization, controlling for 
individual factors such as health status or preference for a plan, which may be influencing 
one’s utilization. To develop a consistent estimate of the effect of the PPOs on utilization, 
the two-stage residual inclusion (2SRI) approach was used to instrument the endogenous 
health plan choice variable. A post-regression counterfactual test was employed to 
determine if any source of bias remains in the model.   
The third aim will determine the effect of PPO benefit design on the state’s total 
third-party payments for member coverage, controlling for non-random selection. Aim 
three results will show how the effect of PPO benefit design on total third-party payments 
would vary, had the same person hypothetically been put in each of the four health plans.  
Aim 3 is of interest to all state health plans concerned with identifying which PPO cost-
sharing arrangements had higher or lower predicted state spending total relative to the 
Indemnity. To estimate the effect of the PPO benefit design on total third-party payments, 
while accounting for the endogeneity of health insurance and the skewed distribution of 
payments, a 2SRI-based two-part model was used.    
 
 CHAPTER 2 
 
STATE EMPLOYEES’ PREFERENCE FOR COST-SHARING 
A. Literature Review and Hypothesis 
 
 In the employer-sponsored insurance market, PPO products are increasingly attractive 
to employers because they are considered to have a cost-containment design (Gabel, et al, 
2001). PPOs are commonly selected by employees because they offer fewer restrictions than 
traditional fee-for-service (FFS) plans or health maintenance organizations (HMOs) (Parente, 
Feldman, and Christianson, 2004). The North Carolina General Assembly decided to offer 
PPOs to state employees in 2006 in an effort to provide employees with more plan choices 
and as a potential benefit design strategy to contain costs (SEHP, 2006). From 2000 to 2006, 
the NC SEHP offered employees a single Indemnity plan, but in October of 2006, three 
additional PPO plans were made available.   
This study seeks to measure the extent to which adverse selection drove plan choice 
in the first year the three PPOs and Indemnity benefits were offered. The questions of inter est 
are: What are the characteristics of members who chose a PPO and specifically, is there a 
greater probability of less healthy employees selecting the PPO benefits with the lowest cost-
sharing requirements? To our best knowledge, the empirical contribution of this work is that 
it is one of a few studies to use a natural experiment for estimating plan choice in a state 
employee health plan population (Parente et al, 2004). Multiple assessments of natural 
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experiments of employee-benefit changes have been conducted in settings such as private 
firms’ (Naessens et al, 2008; Fowles et al, 2004) and public insurance programs such as 
Medicaid eligibility expansion (Epstein and Newhouse, 1998; Levy and Meltzer, 2004). 
However, there is a lack of evidence from natural experiments on the effect of a policy 
change in coverage for state employee health plan populations. The attractiveness of the 
natural experiment in this study is that it allows us to report the effects of a state policy 
change with potentially fewer internal validity threats from omitted confounders; which 
is often difficult to do in standard observational studies (Solanki and Schuaffler, 1999).  
In terms of the policy contribution, this study will estimate the change in the 
probability of state employee plan selection after increasing the price of the PPO 
premiums. Premiums for U.S. state employee health plans have increased on average by 
4.3% each year since 2003 (NCSL, 2009). Therefore, providing estimates from a 
simulation exercise that predicts changes in plan selection after increasing premium price 
will offer insight to state policymakers across the country on how state employees may 
respond to future premium increases.  
Much of the employee plan selection literature has focused on a common set o f 
factors empirically associated with health plan choice. These factors include employees’ 
out-of-pocket requirements, employees’ expected future health service utilization, 
personal income, health status, and preference for an in-network usual source of care 
provider (Richardson et al, 1982; Short and Taylor, 1989; Tumlinson and Mahoney, 
1997; Scanlon et al, 1997; Cutler and Reber, 1998; Cutler, 2009). In terms of employee 
out-of-pocket spending, research has consistently found that as employee OOP health 
plan costs increase, the likelihood of selecting the increased OOP plan decreases (Short 
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and Taylor, 1989, Welch, 1986). For instance, the strongest conclusion from Scanlon and 
colleagues review of 57 published studies on health plan choice was that the costs of a 
health plan is “significantly and inversely related to the probability of choosing or 
switching a health plan, regardless of how costs is measured” (Scanlon, 1997). Variation 
in employee plan selection is highly correlated with OOP premium requirements 
(Scanlon, 1997). Therefore, when modeling plan choice, one should include employee 
OOP costs controls such as employee premium price or coinsurance proxies like required 
deductible amount (Hurley et al, 2004; Polsky, 2005).  
Health status is one of many observed characteristics related to preference for a 
particular plan and teasing this relationship out is important to understanding the 
magnitude of self-selection. Deb and colleagues, using data from the 1987 National 
Medical Expenditure Survey found that families who report having at least one family 
member with a mental illness are more likely to choose an HMO than a full-service FFS 
plan or a catastrophic plan (Deb et al, 1997). Deb and colleagues’ work suggests that the 
consumer’s type of illness is associated with plan preference. In addition to the 
relationship between a diagnosed illness and plan selection, studies have also explored 
how a non-illness health need such as pregnancy, is related to plan selection. For 
instance, Robinson and Huft (1993) examined plan switching among pregnant Bank of 
America employee health plan enrollees who were either in a Kaiser FFS or HMO from 
1981 to 1983. The pregnant women enrolled in the FFS plan during the 1981 pre-
maternity period were more likely to switch to the Kaiser HMO in 1982 or 1983, while 
they were pregnant, than the non-pregnant women (e.g. 1982 or 1983) (p<0.01). The 
authors argue that the lower OOP priced maternity benefit in the FFS plan relative to the 
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HMO was a highly salient variable in the childbearing years. The study concluded that 
pregnant women select plans differently than non-pregnant women enrolled in the Bank 
of America employee health plan (Scanlon et al, 1997, pg. 521). Robinson and Huft’s 
work is another source of empirical evidence that variation in plan selection is likely to 
occur when studying choice among groups that differ in their health condition.  
 Lastly, there is evidence showing between group differences in plan selection 
based on socio-demographic characteristics such as gender, income, and family structure 
(Hertz et al, 2005; Friedman, 2002). In terms of gender differences, Friedman and 
colleagues examined choice and utilization among adults enrolled in the General Motors 
Corporation health plan in 2002. The authors found that women were more likely to 
select the PPO than men, who were more likely to select the FFS plan. The authors 
attribute the greater likelihood of PPO plan selection by women to the lower OOP co-
payments associated with female-specific screenings such as a Papanicolaou smear and 
mammogram cancer screening. Friedman and colleagues’ study is a case where gender 
differences in plan selection are correlated with the benefits being offered.  There is also 
literature available attributing variation in plan selection due to different levels of income 
status (Cameron, Trivedi, Milne, and Piggot, 1988; Cameron and Trivedi, 1991; Davis et 
al, 1995; Chernew, Frick, and McLaughlin, 1997). For instance, the Commonwealth 
Fund conducted a survey-based study on plan choice and satisfaction for adults with 
employer-sponsored coverage in Boston, Los Angeles, and Miami (Davis et al, 1995). 
The study found that employees with reported low-incomes (e.g. $15k to $34k, $35k-
$50k) were more likely to select a managed care plan than reported higher income 
employees (e.g. $51k to $74k, $75k<) who had the option of selecting a managed care 
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plan, but instead enrolled in FFS (p<0.01). The Commonwealth Fund study further 
supports the notion that preference for certain plans varies by income, even in the 
employer-sponsored insurance market.  
Family structure has also empirically been shown to be correlated with employee 
plan choice, although the direction of the effect on plan selection is unclear (Wilensky 
and Rossiter, 1986; Scanlon et al, 1997; Polsky et al, 2004). For instance, Daniel Polsky 
and colleagues analyzed reasons for variation in plan choice based on type of family 
coverage. The authors found that employees with children-coverage were more likely 
than employees with no children coverage to select the indemnity plan rather than the 
managed care plan because the indemnity plan had a more generous coverage for well-
child visits (Polsky et al, 2004). In a similar study, Parente and colleagues examined 
health plan choice based on family status when multiple health plans are available 
(Parente et al, 2004). The authors found that Minnesota state employees with family 
coverage were more likely to select an employer-sponsored PPO or consumer-directed 
health plan over an alternative tiered “care systems” plan than state employees with 
employee-only coverage. These two studies highlight that employees may select plans 
differently when purchasing coverage for their family than they would if they were 
selecting a plan for themselves. Thus, family structure covariates that control for type of 
dependent coverage should be including when modeling employer-sponsored plan 
choice.  
The plan selection component of the dissertation adds new knowledge to the 
health services research literature in two ways. First, this study analyzes a large 
employer-sponsored insurance group whose only new types of plan options are PPO 
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products. Previous studies have analyzed employee choice when multiple new health plan 
products (e.g. PPO, HMO, CDHP) are available (Short and Taylor, 1989; Parente, 
Feldman, and Christianson, 2004). However, there is a lack of literature exploring 
employee health plan decision-making when employees must choose one type of new 
health insurance product  (e.g. PPO) versus multiple new types of products  (e.g., 
Indemnity, PPO, HMO). Introducing two or more products will have a different effect 
than introducing only a single type of product because with two product types consumers 
make choices about (1) the OOP costs and (2) the product fea tures/design. For instance, 
in the NC SEHP, all three PPOs have the same traditional features of PPO such as 
discounted services and no gatekeeper requirement. The PPO products only differ in 
terms of OOP coinsurance requirements, but do not differ in their design. In comparison, 
if the SEHP offered a new HMO and a new PPO product, then employees’ choice would 
not only be based on different OOP plan costs, but also on the different features of the 
products. For instance, traditional HMOs typically require enrollees to select a primary 
care physician (PCP), whereas PPOs traditionally have no PCP gatekeeper requirement. 
Thus, this research study adds to the literature by exploring employee health plan 
selection when the only new health type of health plan product being offered is a PPO. 
Secondly, analysis of employee insurance choice adds to the literature on the 
degree to which plan switching occurs when increasing the price of premiums for 
employees covered under a state-sponsored insurance plan. As discussed in the literature 
review, previous studies on employees’ responses to changes in premiums have been 
analyzed using private firm’s employer-sponsored health plan claims data (McLaughlin 
and Zellers 1992; Chernew, Frick, and McLauglin, 1997; Scanlon et al, 1997). However, 
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few studies have followed suit by investigating state employees’ movement across plans 
when the state employee-sponsored insurance premium increases (Parente et al, 2004). 
Therefore, simulating the changes in the probability of plan selection as a result of a 
premium price increase would fill in the gap in the employer-sponsored insurance 
literature on state employee premium price sensitivity.  
 In addition to the two empirical contributions, this work also offers health policy 
insight to state policymakers across the nation making coverage decisions for their 
respective state employee health plans.  The NC SEHP offers employees an option to 
select a no OOP premium plan or OOP premium-required health plan.  According to the 
National Conference of State Legislatures, half of the fifty U.S. state employee health 
plans offer at least one premium-free insurance product to their employees with 
employee-only coverage (NCSL, 2009). This study’s plan selection estimates provide an 
opportunity for self- insured, state employee health plans across the nation to further 
understand how state employees select plans when there is a combination of premium-
free (i.e. 100% subsidized premium) and OOP premium required plans available.  
The health plan selection framework is based on the assumption that employees in 
the NC SEHP are rational decision-makers. Rational decision-making means that 
consumers are cognizant of the relevant features of the health plans under consideration, 
and that they carefully weigh the health risks they face and the potential costs of the 
medical care that they may consume (Becker, 1962; Feldman et al, 1989). We believe 
there are three key factors employees consider during the health plan decision-making 
process. The first factors are the expected health services utilization needs for the 
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upcoming coverage year, the second are the health plans’ OOP costs for accessing the 
expected health services, and the third are the individual’s lifestyle shocks.  
Expected utilization is the intuition that state employees are capable of 
formulating an idea of their perceived health status.  The state employee selecting the 
plan can then use this self-constructed health status as an indicator of what, and how 
many, health services they or their family will use. Secondly, expected OOP costs are 
defined as the premium and coinsurance amounts the member believes he/she will pay 
given their expected health needs. Although OOP spending and utilization are closely 
related, we see the two as separate components of the decision-making process because 
state employees, regardless of how much care they expect to use, are likely risk averse 
(Feldman et al, 1989). Risk aversion for state employees means employees would rather 
pay a fixed amount of money up front each month in premiums in order to avoid having 
to fully pay for a high-cost health service associated with a future adverse health event.  
The third primary predictor, lifestyle shock, is a term that represents personal 
circumstance and unexpected changes in health needs. Lifestyle shock can be a number 
of time-varying factors such as whether a consumer’s total income will change due to a 
job loss, or if they were recently diagnosed with cancer following a routine screening. 
With the exception of a clinical diagnosis (e.g. cancer, pregnancy), we are unable to 
observe the effect of lifestyle shocks on choice. However, lifestyle shock could influence 
health plan decision-making and thus it’s important to conceptually prescribe it as a key 
predictor of plan choice.  
The conceptual framework diagram below in Figure 1 illustrates the thought 
process that takes place for each employee before choosing a plan. Specifically, the three 
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circles at the top of the model represent our three assumed predictors of choice. After the 
employee considers each of the elements in the three circles, he/she is then able to 
construct a conclusion about which plan may best fit his/her needs and circumstances. 
This self-constructed conclusion then informs the health insurance plan of choice, as 
indicated by the yellow bar leading to a decision. 
Figure 1. Health Plan Selection Conceptual Model  
health plan costs
(i.e. premium, deductible, 
co-payments)
Lifestyle Shock
(i.e. expecting a baby, 
spouse obtaining a job,
personal income)
Health status and perceived
Utilization in relation to health 
Plan benefits offered
Self-Constructed Idea of Best-Fit Plan
Decision
Indemnity
PPO
Basic
PPO
Standard
PPO
Plus
 
The plan selection hypothesis is that higher utilizers of services during the Pre-
PPO coverage period will have a greater probability of selecting the PPO Plus benefit 
because they will be attracted to the Plus benefit’s low cost-sharing requirements. Every 
enrollee, not just high utilizers, would prefer lower deductibles and copayments. In 
hypothesizing which specific groups are likely to select certain plans we rely on the 
assumption that prior utilization is a good indication of future utilization (Richardson et 
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al., 1982; Grazier, 1986) Thus, we hypothesize that members with a Pre-PPO history of 
low utilization, will have a lower probability of selecting the high premium Plus plan 
because the high premium Plus plan’s low costs-sharing requirements aren’t attractive to 
someone not utilizing care often. In comparison, we postulate that frequent utilizers of 
services are more likely to select the high premium Plus plan because the Plus plan has 
the lowest cost-sharing requirements, which are possibly more attractive to members 
frequently accessing care. Our hypothesis that previous high utilizers are more likely to 
select low cost-sharing plans than low utilizers is grounded in previous health plan choice 
work examining chronic users of health services attractiveness to higher premium plans 
(Cardon and Hendel, 2001; Snook, Dobson, and Harris, 2009). 
 
B. Econometric Methods  
The data used for the health plan selection analysis come from the North Carolina 
State Employees and Teachers Health Plan’s (SEHP) insurance claims for services 
incurred from October 1, 2005 to September 31, 2007. In the first 12 months, from 
October 1, 2005 to September 31, 2006, only an Indemnity plan was offered. In the 
second 12 months, from October 1, 2006 to September 31, 2007, three new PPOs in 
addition to the Indemnity plan were offered. The SEHP data set is comprised of inpatient 
claims, outpatient claims, pharmacy claims, professional claims, and member 
information. The data set was acquired through the Carolina Cost and Quality Initiative 
(CCQI), a joint effort between the Cecil G. Sheps Center for Health Services Research 
and the Gillings School of Global Public Health at the University of North Carolina. Blue 
Cross Blue Shield of North Carolina serves as the administrator of the NC SEHP.  
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For this study, generous is defined as high-priced OOP premium plans with low 
cost-sharing requirements (e.g. deductible, copayments) relative to low-price premium 
plans with high cost-sharing requirements. The most generous plan in terms of OOP 
requirements was the Plus plan because it had the lowest deductible, coinsurance, and 
copayment requirements. We assume employees will consider the total OOP costs (e.g. 
premium, deductible, and coinsurance) associated with each plan when making a 
decision. Therefore, employees who select higher OOP premium plans may consciously 
do so knowing they have lower OOP cost-sharing requirements. The term generous has 
been used outside the context of cost-sharing requirements by actuaries and health 
economists who describe generous in relation to the (a) range of available medical 
benefits or (b) the spreading of risk among multiple parties (Cutler and Reber, 1998; 
Gabel, 2009; Koch, 2009). But for purposes of this study, the term generous is used 
throughout the paper as the shorthand to refer to plans with lower cost-sharing 
requirements as seen below in Table 1.  
    Table 1. The Ranking of Out-of-Pocket Cost-sharing Generosity by Plan Type  
 
Degree of Cost-
sharing 
Generosity 
 
Plan Type 
 
Premium 
 
 
(employee/ 
family coverage) 
 
Deductible 
 
 
(employee/ 
family coverage) 
OOP 
Coinsurance 
Amount 
                                        
(Members’ % & 
State’s %) 
Primary Care 
& 
Specialist 
Copayment 
Most Generous Plus $39/$535 $150/$450 90/10 $15/$30 
Second Most 
Generous 
Standard $0.00/$480 $300/$900 80/20 $20/$40 
Minimal 
Generosity 
Indemnity $0.00/$371 $450/$1,350 70/30 $25/$50 
Least Generous Basic $0.00/$440 $600/$1,800 80/20 $25/$25 
 
All four plans provide coverage for the same network of providers and all four 
plans have the same prescription drug copayment requirements. So theoretically, state 
 16 
employees’ criteria for selection should no t be based on preference for a particular 
provider or with the intentions of getting a more generous prescription drug benefit, but 
rather variation in selection should be driven by the different OOP requirements 
associated with each plan. There were was one health condition that had a plan-specific 
more generous benefit and it was the Indemnity plan. The Indemnity plan had the lowest 
cost-sharing requirements for using mental health and substance abuse services. As a 
result of the Indemnity distinction, members with a mental health or substance abuse 
diagnosis may perceive the Indemnity to be their most generous plan, even though the 
Plus plan had the lowest overall cost-sharing requirements for most services. This is not 
an alternative hypothesis, but rather an informational point to the reader about the 
coverage caveats to certain plans.  
 Also, higher rates were paid by the state to providers for services covered under 
the Indemnity plan; making third-party payment costs for the same set of provider 
services higher under the Indemnity than under the comparable PPO designs (SEHP, 
2007).  For instance, unit prices were higher under the Indemnity’s contract for services, 
so regardless of what a member paid in cost-sharing, the Indemnity reimbursed at a 
higher price than the PPOs (e.g. the third-party cost for primary care ambulatory visit 
under the Indemnity was $140 vs. $130 under the PPOs). The reason for the difference in 
unit prices was because the PPOs operated under a discounted reimbursement contract 
while the Indemnity plan continued to operate under the old, more generously 
reimbursable contracts (NC SEHP, 2007). The higher state reimbursement for the same 
set of services under the Indemnity plan should only have an effect on the state’s 
payment totals, but it should not have a direct effect on employee plan selection and 
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subsequent health care use. For instance, even though providers are paid more under the 
Indemnity plan, state employees do not in turn pay higher OOP costs. For example, out of 
all four plans, the PPO Basic plan had the most expensive OOP cost-sharing 
requirements, whereas the Indemnity plan had the second highest OOP cost-sharing 
requirements. Therefore, the higher contracted reimbursements should not be the sole 
deterrent to Indemnity plan selection or health service use because there was a more OOP 
expensive plan available than the Indemnity. Instead, the implications of the higher 
contracted reimbursements under the Indemnity plan may be more evident later in this 
study when analyzing the effect of benefit design on third-party payments. Specifically, a 
high third-party payment total under the Indemnity plan may not be a result of members 
frequently using health services under the Indemnity, but rather may be a result of the 
higher amount paid by the state per unit of service.   
Lastly, in terms of plan information and education, each state employee was to 
receive a benefits booklet that explained the details of each product. Each state employee 
could also contact a health benefits representative toll- free by phone with plan choice 
questions during and immediately after the open-enrollment period. The degree to which 
each employee received information on coverage options was unobserved.  
The study population was comprised of non-retired, state employees and their 
family members who were continuously enrolled in the NC SEHP from October 1, 2005 
to September 31, 2007 and were not simultaneously enrolled in Medicare, yielding 
300,034 members. To arrive at this study population, employees who added a family 
member or removed a family member during either of the two coverage years were 
excluded because the goal was to observe whether previous year predictors (e.g. health 
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status, utilization totals) affect future plan choice. The only exception is that we did not 
exclude pregnant women who had at least one enrolled child in either of the two years 
and met other study criteria, since the family status for this enrollee would not change 
with the birth of a new child. F 
Retirees were excluded because retired SEHP members could only participate in 
the Indemnity plan. SEHP members receiving Medicare are excluded because the 
availability of an alternative subsidized coverage option allows them to have a different 
set of choices than the non-retired study sample of interest. We only excluded members 
who went without state employee coverage for more than 30 days in order to not exclude 
employees who switched to another state job. Conversion to a new position within the 
state generally causes the claims to reflect a gap in coverage for two to four weeks since a 
new job creates a new health insurance policy member identification number (Durrell, 
2008). For instance, a third-grade public school instructor teaching in elementary school 
X in 2005, and then relocating to teach fourth-grade in elementary school Z in 2006, 
would have two member identification numbers in this dataset.  Therefore, we did not 
exclude members with brief gaps (e.g. <30 days) in coverage (n=19,202; 6.4%). The 
resulting study sample consists of 216,485 state employees, 62,958 children, 17,097 
spouses, and 2,864 students for a total of 300,034 members that are divided into 216,485 
families as shown in Figure 2 below. 
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Figure 2. Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria of Study Population 
501,716 SEHP Members
w/ coverage at one point between 
10/1/05-09/30/07 186,539 members were not 
continuously enrolled or whose 
coverage was interrupted for 
more than 30 days. 
315,177Members
with continuous coverage between 
10/1/05-09/30/07
300,034 Members
Met the inclusion criteria for the study
216,485 Families analyzed for the study
Documented Cases of:
7,069 = Receiving Medicare  
6,433 = Retired
216,485 Employees 62,958 Children 17,727 Spouse2,864 Student
 
 The study variables were constructed at the family- level because employees’ 
health insurance decisions take into account the health needs of themselves as well as all 
family members.  A family can be defined as only the state employee, in cases where the 
employee had no additional coverage for dependents, or a family can consist of state 
employees and their dependents enrolled in the SEHP.  
The outcome of variable of interest was choice of one of the four health plans; 
PPO Basic, PPO Standard, PPO Plus, and Indemnity. For this analysis, each employee 
and his/her family are coded for having the plan that was submitted at the conclusion of 
the open enrollment period. No recoding of employees’ selected plans post-open 
enrollment period occurred because the claims do not provide a consistent way to recode 
all switchers’ choice. Not recoding the less than 1% (n=2,817) of employees who 
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switched plans after the open enrollment period resembles the criteria for an intent-to-
treat (ITT) analysis; but ITT was not the focus of this paper.  
The key explanatory variables were total number of inpatient days and total 
number of office visits obtained in the pre-PPO period. Total family inpatient days 
represent the number of cumulative hospital days over the course of the pre-PPO 
coverage period. Total office visits represent the number of ambulatory care visits to 
physician offices, hospital outpatient departments, and non-admission hospital emergency 
department visits. The algorithm to identify an office visit consisted of a unique 
combination of patient ID, provider ID, and new end of service date. For instance, if a 
state employee goes to a doctor’s office and gets a routine physical from a primary care 
physician and a biopsy read by a pathologist, it is considered one office visit because the 
two services described took place in one day. If the state employee gets the physical on 
day one and the biopsy consultation on day two, then the algorithm will count them as 
having two office visits. For purposes of this study, the term office visits is used to 
describe all visits in the ambulatory care setting.  
We did not include a separate emergency department (ED) utilization measure 
because ED visits are coded into other measures. ED visits that resulted in a hospital 
admission are included as counts of total hospital days and ER visits that didn’t result in 
an admission are included as counts of office visits. Out of the 300,034 members in the 
sample, 2.1% of members had an ED visits that resulted in an inpatient admission and 
3.8% of members had an ED visit resulting in a non-hospital admission (see Table 2). 
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           Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Excluded Variables in the Selection Analysis                                          
 
Excluded 
Variables 
 
 
  
Employee-only Study 
Population 
 
 
Mean (SD) 
N=176,010 Families 
Employee + Dependents 
Study Population 
 
 
Mean (SD) 
N=40,475 Families 
Avg. Third-Party Payments 
 
$3,794.21 
($8,584) 
$6,138.10 
($14,097) 
 
Avg. Out-of-Pocket Premium Per Family 
 
~ 
~ 
$443.02 
(91.12) 
Percent w/ ED Visits Resulting in Admits 2.2 % 6.0% 
Percent w/ ED Visits Not Resulting in Admit 4.8 % 7.1% 
Percent with ED Inpatient Readmission 0.1% 0.4% 
Percent with ED Revisit 0.3% <0.1% 
Avg. Number of 30-Day Prescription Fills  8.3 (5.4) 15.7 (12.1) 
Age 44.0 (10.6) 34.4 (8.6) 
Percent Male  29.0% 35.0% 
Average Family Size ~ 2.8 (2.3) 
 
Given that less than 6% of the sample made contact with the ED, we thought it was 
logical to lump the ED visits into the other main utilization categories. The consequences 
of the ED coding decision is discussed in the limitations section.  
The measures median household income and family compensation are used to 
account for household characteristics. Data on personal income were not available and 
therefore median household income (MHI) from the enrollees’ zipcode served as a proxy 
for income (Gornick et al, 1996; O’Conner et al, 2003). The 2006 Nielson Claritas 
demographic dataset was used to obtain MHIs for each state employee. The Claritas 
demographic dataset provides yearly national estimates on household, population, and 
economic measures using data collected from the Census, surveys, and other Nielson 
proprietary collection instruments. The MHI value for each family was calculated by 
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linking state employee’s five digit zip code with the Claritas demographic data set. To 
control for differences in family composition, binary variables for spousal coverage, 
children coverage, and family coverage (e.g. spouse and children) were obtained. Type of 
dependent coverage is connected to premium because the premium price increases as the 
number of dependents enrolled in the plan increases. Therefore, in the choice model 
estimated on the employee-only coverage sample, where no family composition binary 
variables are included because no one has dependent coverage, the premium variable is 
used to account for OOP premium price differences. The means and standard deviations 
for all variables in the choice model for the employee-only coverage sample and the 
employee plus dependent coverage sample are reported below in Table 3.  
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   Table 3. Descriptive Statistics on the Variables Used in the Selection Estimation Model              
 
To control for health status, the Chronic Illness and Disability Payment System 
(CDPS) was applied to the dataset’s International Classification of Diseases (ICD-9) 
inpatient diagnostic codes in order to develop disease indicators. CDPS is a claims-based 
   
Employee-only Study 
Population 
 
 
 
Mean (SD) 
Employee + 
Dependents Study 
Population 
 
 
Mean (SD) 
   N=176,010 Employees* N=40,475 Families* 
Dependent Variables    
  Indemnity Plan Selected  24.0%  16.5% 
  PPO Basic Plan Selected   3.0%  6.3% 
  PPO Standard Plan Selected  59.1%  61.2% 
  PPO Plus Plan Selected  13.9%  16.8% 
Primary Explanatory Variables    
  Total Inpatient Days  0.3 (2.1)  0.5 (6.7) 
  Office Visits  6.1 (9.3)  11.1 (12.3) 
Control  Variables    
  % with Employee-Only Coverage 100%  n/a 
  % with Employee and Spouse Coverage ~  13.1% 
  % with Employee and Child Coverage ~  66.1% 
  % with Family Coverage ~  20.8% 
   Median Household Income 
 
$45,801.2 
 (15,971.59)  
$46,106.88  
(16,143.16) 
Diagnosis  Indicators    
  Hypertension                     16.6%          22.4% 
  Diabetes           15.1% 9.3% 
  Mental Illness  14.9%          12.6% 
  Back Pain  11.3%            12.6% 
  Asthma   8.1% 7.9% 
  Non-back Skeletal  4.8% 9.2% 
  Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease  2.4%            7.2% 
  Cancer   2.2% 8.2% 
  Cardiovascular Disease  1.7% 9.8% 
  Epilepsy   3.1% 2.4% 
  Other Diagnosed Condition**  2.7% 4.9% 
  Disorders of the Eye       2.2% 2.6% 
  Pregnancy  2.1% 1.7% 
  Chronic Liver Disease   1.0% 1.3% 
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diagnosis grouper that recognizes the 15,000 ICD-9 codes and divides each code into 20 
clinically homogeneous groups, which correspond to body systems or type of diagnosis 
(Kronick, 2000). CDPS was used because it is a systematic method for pulling 
individuals’ ICD-9 codes and putting them into binary disease categories. Alternative risk 
adjustment scales commonly used in secondary claims analysis such as the Charlson’s 
comorbidity index (Lehman et al, 1997) and the Elixhauser Index (Elixhauser et al, 1998) 
were considered. Several head-to-head studies have been conducted comparing 
Elixhauser and Charlson and the majority of the studies conclude that both comorbidity 
measures perform equally (Ramano et al, 1993; Ghali et al, 1996; Farley, Harley, and 
Devine, 2006).  For instance, a recent study comparing their ability to predict healthcare 
expenditures showed Elixhauser’s (adjusted R2=0.1148) and Charlson’s (adjusted 
R2=0.1172) performance was near equal (Farley, Harley, and Devine, 2006). No 
empirical studies however have compared all three tools’ (e.g. CDPS, Charlson, and 
Elixhauser) performance to each other.  
We recognize that CDPS has not been widely used in retrospective claims-based 
studies to the same extent that the Elixhauser and Charlsons’ scales have been applied. 
One reason for its limited use is because CDPS was originally adopted to specifically 
compensate more fairly for the disabled Medicaid population (Kronick et al., 1996; 
Kronick et al., 2000). To address concerns about CDPS’s performance as a diagnosis 
grouper, inpatient and office utilization covariates are included as additional controls for 
health severity. Previous studies seeking to better control for health severity in claims 
data have included inpatient and office-based utilization metrics as supportive proxies for 
health status (Klea et al, 2005; Deb, Munkin, and Trivedi, 2006).  
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The CDPS-based macro provided the logic to place all ICD-9 diagnosis codes into 
major diagnosis categories. The major diagnoses groups were hypertension, diabetes, 
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), mental illness, back-pain, cardiovascular 
disease, non-back skeletal, cancer, asthma, epilepsy, disorders of the eye, pregnancy, 
liver disease, and other diagnoses. Detailed descriptions of what each diagnosis group 
represents as well as its associated ICD-9 codes are available (see Appendix 1). Most of 
the diagnosis indicator names have a distinct interpretation as to what conditions they 
represent. For instance, the diabetes indicator represents those with Type 1 or Type 2 
diabetes mellitus (ICD 249.0-250.9). However, the two diagnoses indicators with a broad 
definition are the mental illness indicator and the other diagnoses indicator. The mental 
illness indicator includes all mental disorders, regardless of severity, such as 
schizophrenia, depression, and anxiety; as well as substance abuse diagnosis. Some 
classify mental health and substance abuse diagnosis as behavioral health, but we use the 
term mental illness to define all ICD-9 codes for mental health and substance abuse 
diagnoses. The other diagnosis group represents all conditions that were diagnosed in le ss 
than 1% of the study population and did not have a major diagnosed group to be assigned 
to. The other diagnoses group represents a diverse set of ICD-9 codes such as sleep 
disorders, road vehicle accidents/injury, and migraines (see Appendix 1.) 
To model state employees’ plan selection a McFadden conditional logit choice 
model was used because it estimates the effects of the health plan choice (e.g. premium 
price) and the characteristics of the individuals making the choice (e.g. age, diagnosed 
illness)(Parente et al, 2004). In the choice model, the dependent variable was plan choice, 
the key independent variables were pre-PPO inpatient and office utilization, and the 
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covariates were member demographic characteristics (e.g. income, age, health status) and 
plan attributes (e.g. premium, coverage type).  
In order to explore the factors that differentially effect health plan decisions 
between those with employees only coverage and those with some form of employee plus 
family coverage, we ran separate models for each coverage group.  There are some 
differences in the set of covariates between the two models. The employee-only model 
had age and gender of the primary subscriber as controls, whereas these variables were 
less relevant for the family models. The family model includes the choice premium 
whereas the employee-only choice model does not because there was no variation in 
OOP premium within each choice.  
A series of specification tests were performed to determine the appropriate 
functional form of the key utilization explanatory variables. Several options were 
considered, including: (1) using utilization variables in their continuous form; (2) 
transforming utilization variables into splines; or (3) reducing utilization variables into 
multiple binary variables.  The NR-squared version of the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test 
was conducted to determine which of the three functional form options was statistically 
appropriate. We categorized office visits into 6 binary indicators as follows: 0 visits, 1 to 
4 visits, 5 to 7 visits, 8 to 14 visits, 15 to 59 visits, and 60 or more visits. We categorized 
total inpatient days into 3 binary indicators as follows: 0 days, 1 to 2 days, and 3 or more 
days. Even once we added a fourth total inpatient days indicator to capture severely ill 
outliers (e.g. 60 or more inpatient days), the NR2 version of LM test still favored only the 
use of the three aforementioned binary indicators (LM=47.2; p=0.11) (see Table 4).  
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          Table 4. NR-squared version of LM test to determine functional form of total inpatient days 
Test # Restricted Logit Model 
Functional Form 
Unrestricted Logit Model 
Functional Form 
Test Result 
 
LM Test #1 
 
Continuous form of  
total inpatient days 
 
Three binary indicators  
(e.g. 0 days, 1-2 days, 
3>days) 
 
 
LM=44.9; p<0.01 
 
 
LM Test #2 
 
Three binary indicators  
(e.g. 0 days, 1-2 days, 
3<days) 
 
 
Four binary indicators 
 (e.g. 0 days, 1-2 days, 3-
30 days, 30<days) 
 
LM=47.1; p<0.01 
 
Theoretically, total third-party payments may better capture the intensity of the 
services, or the specialization of services being used, that a general metric for utilization 
may not reflect. A Likelihood-Ratio (LR) test was performed to determine if prior year 
third-party payments better explained variation in plan selection than the inpatient and 
office utilization. The log-likelihood values favored including third-party payments as the 
key explanatory variable (Log likelihood= -15379.7) over the inpatient and utilization 
variables (Log likelihood=-15453.4) (LR test p<0.05) (see Table 6). 
         Table 5. Reported Log-Likelihood Values for RHS Key Variable Inclusion Specification 
 Utilization-based Choice 
Model’s Log-Likelihood 
Value  
Third-party payment-based 
Choice Model’s Log-Likelihood 
Value 
Employee-Only Sample 
 
 
 
-15453.4 
 
-15379.7; p<0.05 
Employee plus family 
coverage option 
Subsample  
 
-15205.1 
 
-15161.8; p<0.05 
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 Despite the results of the LR test, utilization was chosen as the key explanatory 
variable instead of payments because interpretation of third-party payments can be 
misleading and less helpful in describing the characteristics of members who select 
certain plans. For instance, informing policymakers that members who accumulated 
$30,000 in third-party payments were more likely to select a plan does not speak to the 
level of services the member consumed. The $30,000 third-party payment total can be a 
result of having multiple inpatient and office visits or can be a result of a member having 
one costly procedure (e.g. trauma surgery for vehicle accident). Therefore, inpatient and 
office utilization are included as the key explanatory variables to provide more specificity 
about the utilization patterns of members that selected certain plans.                                                                       
Specification tests on the functional form of the socio-demographic variables were 
also performed.  A Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test was conducted to determine whether to 
include the median household income (MHI) variable in continuous or dichotomous 
form. The LM test (LM=39.3; p<0.01) favored the categorized form of MHI into 4 binary 
indicators:  $31,000-$40,000, $40,001-$55,000, $55,001-$98,000, and $98,001 or more. 
In the employee-only model the age covariate is included to control for differences in 
plan selection based on age. Older adult employees have been shown to select plans 
differently than the younger members as seen in employer-sponsored insurance studies 
on plan choice (Scanlon et al, 1997). The LR test determined that the quadratic form of 
age (Log likelihood=-15426.1) most maximized the log- likelihood compared to the 
continuous-only (Log likelihood=-15893.8) and the dichotomous (Log likelihood=-
15632.2) functional forms of age (p<0.05).  
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The coefficients in a conditional logit model, like most non-linear models, do not 
have a straightforward interpretation. Therefore, this study reports the marginal and 
incremental effects of plan selection rather than the coefficients, although the conditional 
logit coefficients are included in the appendix (see Appendix 2).  To determine if 
differences in the probability of plan selection between groups was statistically 
significant we bootstrapped the choice model’s standard errors and obtained the predicted 
probabilities at the 2.5th and 97.5th percentile to form a non-parametric confidence interval 
at the 95% level. The bootstrapping technique is commonly used for generating unbiased 
standard errors in non- linear models (Goldman, 1995; Thorpe and Howard, 2003). The 
standard errors reported in the results were derived from 1,000 bootstrapped iterations.  
 
C. Plan Selection Results 
The benefit with the highest enrollment was the PPO Standard plan in the 
employee-only and employee plus dependents coverage groups as seen in Figure 3.  
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The Figure 3 shows that 61% of the employee-only population and 58% of the dependent 
coverage population selected the PPO Standard benefit. The distribution of plan 
enrollment in our study population was consistent with the plan enrollment of the overall 
NC SEHP member population, where PPO Standard was also the most frequently 
selected plan (Durrel, 2008). In the employee-only sample, the popularity of the PPO 
Standard plan was likely due to the fact that the PPO Standard plan was the most cost-
sharing generous benefit available from the set of premium-free plans. Similarly, for 
those with family coverage, the Standard plan was likely attractive because Standard’s 
premium was lower than the Indemnity and PPO Plus premiums and the cost-sharing 
requirements were the second lowest available. 
Before presenting the regression adjusted probabilities, it is important for the 
reader to first understand the unadjusted descriptive statistics that show the distribution of 
plan selection based on prior year inpatient and office utilization totals. For instance, 
Figure 4 shows that the largest percentage of families with 3 or more total inpatient days 
chose the Plus plan. Figure 5 shows that 64% of Plus plan membership consisted of 
families that had 8 or more office visits. Again, Figure 4 and Figure 5 show descriptive 
statistics, not adjusted probabilities or predictions. They are included to provide the 
reader with a general picture of how the population selected plans based on their pre-PPO 
utilization totals. 
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Each of the plan percentages should equal to 100 percent. For instance, Figure 4 
can be interpreted as the out of the 49,525 families that selected the Indemnity plan, 93% 
of them had zero total inpatient days, 4% of the families had between 1 to 2 total 
inpatient days, and 3% of the families had between 3 or more total inpatient days in the 
Pre-PPO year.  
 
         n=49,525               n=4,634                n=117,696              n=44,630 
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0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Indemnity PPO Basic PPO Standard PPO Plus
Employee-Only
Employee + Spouse
Employee + Child
Employee + Spouse +
Child
Figure 5. The Percen t of Enrollment in Each Plan by Prior-Year 
Office Visits Total
(n=216,485)
 
Figure 5 is included to show how the three major office utilization groups selected 
the plans. The take-away message from Figure 5 is that Standard plan selection was the 
most frequently selected plan regardless of prior year office utilizaiton level. Based on 
unadjusted descriptive statisics, it appears that as the number of prior year total office 
visits increased, the percentage of families selecting the Plus benefit increased and the 
Indemnity selection descreased.  
 The conditional logit results on the employee-only coverage sample suggest that 
prior year inpatient utilization does have an effect on plan selection, controlling for 
office-based utilization and other observed covariates. For instance, state employees with 
employee-only coverage and three or more total inpatient days had an 11% greater 
probability of selecting the Plus plan than state employees with employee-only coverage 
and zero inpatient days [CI= (0.103 to 0.238)]. State employees with employee-only 
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coverage and three or more total inpatient days had an 6% greater probability of selecting 
the Standard plan than state employees with employee-only coverage and zero inpatient 
days, holding all else constant [CI= (0.014 to 0.219)]. However, there was no statistically 
significant difference in the probability of selecting the Indemnity or Basic plans between 
those with zero total inpatient days and those with three or more inpatient days in the 
prior year.  
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
Indemnity Selection Basic Selection Standard Selection Plus Selection
Zero Total Inpatient Days Three or More Total Inpatient Days
Figure 6. Comparing the Probability of Plan Selection by Prior-Year Inpatient Use and 
Illustrating if Difference is Statistically Significant 
*
*
*Difference is  Significant (P<.05)
 
In terms of office utilization, the differential effect results show that the number 
of prior year total office visits in the employee-only choice model did not have a 
significant effect on plan choice, controlling for inpatient use as seen in Figure 7 below. 
Whether an employee had zero office visits or a total number of office visits around the 
sample mean (i.e. 6 office visits), there was no difference in the predicted probability of 
selecting a generous cost-sharing plan. The office use results suggest that state employees 
with more office use in the prior year were not significantly more likely to select a 
generous plan compared to those with zero office use.   
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 The marginal effect of having certain diagnosed conditions in the pre-PPO 
coverage period, such as a chronic disease, resulted in an increase in the probability of 
selecting a more generous plan. For instance, employees with employee-only coverage 
and a diagnosis of hypertension had a 10% greater predicted probability of selecting the 
Standard plan [CI= (0.059 to 0.377)] and a 16% greater predicted probability of selecting 
the Plus plan [CI = (0.119 to 0.564)], than members with employee-only coverage who 
did not have a hypertensive diagnosis. The differential effect was statistically significant 
at the 5% level, suggesting that hypertensive members with employee-only coverage 
chose their plans differently than non-hypertensive members with employee-only 
coverage. 
The greater predicted probability of selecting the Standard and Plus plans was 
also statistically significant (p<0.05) for employees with employee-only coverage that 
had diagnosis of diabetes or chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD). For 
instance, state employees with employee-only coverage and a diabetes diagnosis had a 
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14% greater probability of selecting the Plus plan, than state employee with employee 
only coverage who did not have a diabetes diagnosis [CI= (0.102 to 0.396)]. 
Additionally, state employees with employee-only coverage with a mental health 
diagnosis had a 9% greater probability of selecting the Indemnity Plan than employees 
with employee-only coverage who did not have a mental health diagnosis [CI=(0.038 to 
0.292)]. Other types of diagnosed conditions (asthma, back pain, etc) however, did not 
significantly affect plan choice in the employee-only sample.  
When estimating plan selection on the sub sample of only members with 
dependent coverage, we again find that inpatient utilization does have an effect on plan 
selection. However, in the family coverage sample, when controlling for office use and 
other covariates, families with three or more total inpatient days were more likely to 
select the Standard plan (p<0.01) and not the Plus plan (p>0.05). This is in contrast with 
the inpatient utilization findings from the employee-only analysis. However, the increase 
in Standard plan selection is still consistent with the overall inpatient finding that families 
with three or more inpatient days, were more likely to select one of the two most 
generous plans (e.g. Standard and Plus) than families with zero total inpatient days. 
The incremental effect between families with few office visits versus those with 
multiple office visits was not similar across each family coverage type in the family 
coverage choice model. The Standard plan was the only plan that showed a statistically 
significant difference in the predicted probability of selection between families with zero 
office visits to those with 8 to 14 office visits for each type of family coverage option. 
In terms of the effect of diagnosis on selection, members with employee plus 
children coverage and a diabetic diagnosis had a 14% greater probability of selecting the 
 36 
Plus plan than members with employee plus children coverage that did not have a 
diabetic diagnosis, holding all else constant [CI= (0.08 to 0.32)]. Members with 
employee plus children coverage and a mental illness diagnosis also had a 16% greater 
probability of selecting the Indemnity plan than those without a mental illness diagnosis 
and enrolled in employee plus child coverage [CI=(0.12 to 0.27)]. Lastly, families with 
employee plus spouse coverage and a member who had a low back-pain diagnosis had a 
17% greater probability of Standard plan selection compared to families with employee 
plus spouse coverage option but had no low back pain diagnosis. This difference was 
statistically significant at the 5% level [CI= (0.05 to 0.61)]. There were no other 
differences in plan selection by diagnosed condition for members with some form of 
dependent coverage. 
To quantify the importance of the NC General Assembly’s 8.9% premium 
increase in 2010, a simulation excersise was performed to predict if members with 
dependent coverage would chose their plans differently once the premium price of the 
plan they originally selected increased.  Results show that an 8.9% premium Plus plan 
premium increase would decrease the predicted probability of Plus plan selection as seen 
in Tables 6 through Table 8.  The decrease in Plus plan selection occurred for every 
family coverage type and was statistically significant at the 5% level; suggesting that 
members with family coverage, spousal coverage, and children coverage would chose 
their plans differently if the price of the Plus plan increased from its original value.  
However, when increasing the price of the PPO Basic or Standard plans’ premium, there 
was no statistically significant difference in the probability of selection compared to 
when the Basic and Standard plans were at their original price. The premium increase 
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predictions were  estimated on high-utilization families because they are the group who 
would most likely be acutly impacted by a premium increase given their frequent use of 
health care coverage.                
Table 6.  The change in the predicted probability of plan selection when increasing 
premium price by 8.9% for high utilizers with employee plus children coverage**  
  Indemnity Basic Standard Plus 
Probability of selection when each premium is at 
its original price 15% 17% 52% 16% 
Increase the Basic Premium Price only 15% 16% 52% 16% 
Increase the Standard Premium Price only 16% 18% 51%  17% 
Increase the Plus Premium Price  only 16% 17% 55% 12%* 
 
*Difference in the predicted probability from baseline was statistically significant at 5% level.  
**High-Users = Families with 3 or more inpatient total inpatient days, 15 to 22 Office Visits      
 
 
Table 7.  The change in the predicted probability of plan selection when increasing 
premium price by 8.9% for high utilization members with employee plus spousal 
coverage** 
  Indemnity Basic Standard Plus 
Probability of selection when each premium 
is at its original price 21% 19% 52% 9% 
Increase the Basic Premium Price only 20% 18% 53% 8% 
Increase the Standard Premium Price only 20% 19% 50% 11% 
Increase the Plus Premium Price  only 22% 18% 54% 6%* 
 
*Difference in the predicted probability from baseline was statistically significant at 5% level.  
**High-Users = Families with 3 or more inpatient total inpatient days, 15 to 22 Office Visits      
 
 
Table 8.  The change in the predicted probability of plan selection when increasing 
premium price by 8.9% for high utilization members with employee plus family 
coverage** 
 Indemnity Basic Standard Plus 
Probability of selection when each premium 
is at its original price 16% 16% 52% 15% 
Increase the Basic Premium Price only 17% 15% 53% 15% 
Increase the Standard Premium Price only 17% 17% 50% 16% 
Increase the Plus Premium Price  only 18% 18% 54% 11%* 
 
*Difference in the predicted probability from baseline was statistically significant at 5% level.  
**High-Users = Families with 3 or more inpatient total inpatient days, 15 to 22 Office Visits      
 
 38 
In short, the lack of change in the predicted probability of selection in the PPO 
Basic and Standard plans following a premium increase, but the significant decrease in 
the probability of Plus plan selection, suggests that state employees with family coverage 
would likely be more price sensitive to an increase in the Plus plan. Specifically, it 
appears that a premium increase in the most generous cost-sharing plan would result in 
some families moving out of the Plus plan and selecting the Standard plan, the second 
most cost-sharing plan.  
 
D. Discussion 
 The plan selection results suggest there are two primary plan selection behaviors 
of NC state employees and their families with a chronic disease. First, we see evidence of 
adverse selection because members with a chronic condition had significantly greater 
probability of selecting a high premium, low OOP coinsurance plan compared to those 
with no diagnosed chronic condition. For example, employees and their families with a 
chronic condition such as hypertension had a greater probability of selecting the two most 
generous plans (i.e. Standard and Plus) than those families without a hypertensive 
diagnosis.  
Secondly, the study results suggest that plan selection varies by specific 
diagnoses. For instance, families who had a member with a mental illness diagnosis were 
more likely to select the Indemnity plan in both study samples than members without a 
mental illness diagnosis. In this case adverse selection is still evident because the mental 
illness diagnosed member is selecting the most cost-sharing generous plan for his/her 
condition, even though it is not necessarily the high-premium, overall most generous PPO 
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Plus plan. The Indemnity plan had a more generous mental health and substance abuse 
benefit than the PPOs because it had the lowest mental health and substance abuse 
coinsurance requirements.  Therefore, mental illness diagnosed members may be 
selecting an alternative, less overall generous plan because it offers a parsimonious 
condition-specific benefit that caters to their diagnosed condition.  
In terms of the premium increase results, it was hypothesized that high utilizers 
would enroll in the PPO Plus plan, even if the premium increased, because the low OOP 
copayments, obtained after exceeding their low deductible, were attractive. Rejecting the 
hypothesis, these results show that if state policymakers increased the OOP price of the 
Plus plan premium, some high-utilization families may convert to the PPO Standard plan. 
This is a situation where price sensitivity attenuates adverse selection. In fact, David 
Cutler and colleagues reached a similar conclusion when they examined plan selection of 
those employed by the state of Massachusetts (Cutler, Lincoln, and Zeckhauser, 2009). 
Specifically, they looked at movement between a generous FFS plan and a less generous 
85-15 PPO plan in the Massachusetts state health plan. Their study found that when 
increasing the OOP premium price of the generous FFS plan, nearly two-thirds of FFS 
enrollees were likely to switch to the less generous 85-15 plan. Movement into a less 
cost-sharing generous plan is similar to what we observed in the NC SEHP selection 
predictions following a premium increase. Studies have shown that the implications of 
large numbers of members moving out of the most generous plan and into the less 
generous alternative could potentially result in the generous plan no longer being a 
financially viable health plan option (e.g. death spiral).  
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This study showed that the 8.9% increase in the price of the Plus plan premium 
caused significant movement into the less generous Standard plan. The NC SEHP and 
other state employee health plans should consider future experiments that explore what 
the premium price tipping-point is in order for high utilizers not to select the most 
generous plan. Identifying the premium price point where members are likely to switch 
after a premium increase would be of value to self- funded employer groups, like the NC 
SEHP, when forecasting enrollment and payment totals for coverage within each plan.  
       The plan selection component of the dissertation contains a few limitations that 
deserve discussion. First, the generalizability of the study to other state employee health 
plans is limited because the member composition (avg. age, sex, salary) and benefit 
designs of the NC SEHP are likely different from other SEHPs. For instance, many state 
employee health plans do not include public school teachers in their member population, 
but in the NC SEHP, public school teachers represent 48% of the member population. If 
there is a systematic difference between teachers and other types of state employees, even 
after adjusting for observed factors, then our results may be less applicable to other 
SEHPs where the county school district, not the state, offers teachers their health benefits.   
        Second, in constructing the key utilization measures we decided to place all ED 
visits that resulted in a hospital admission into the total hospital days variable and place 
all outpatient ED visits into the total office use counts. The limitation of this approach is 
the assumption that an ED visit and an office visit are of equal weight. The costs and 
intensity of services associated with an ED visit are likely not equal to the costs and 
services associated with routine care (e.g. screening, mammogram) given during an office 
visit. However, given that less than 6% of the sample had an ED visit; we argue that 
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creating a separate ED utilization variable may not necessarily help explain more 
variation in plan selection.  
Third, a limitation of the price sensitivity modeling exercise is that we identify the 
premium coefficient differences in family coverage type and not the actual price changes 
within each family type. Without actually obtaining data from a randomized experiment 
examining the effect of price on selection, we cannot conclude with certainty that the 
aforementioned movement across plans would occur with upcoming premium increase in 
2010. This modeling exercise is still helpful in predicting how state employees may have 
responded to a premium increase during the initial launch of the PPOs. 
Lastly, there are several omitted variables which may help explain variatio n in 
plan selection. For instance, state employee salary or actual household income would be 
useful in explaining why some members chose the low or high OOP plans in terms of 
financial means and affordability. We include a proxy for income through the use of a 
Median Household Income value, but how closely the MHI matches the actual household 
income of an employee is undetermined.  Another omitted variable is the inability to 
determine if an employee had additional health insurance options through a spouse. This 
is a limitation because if there was another choice available, a state employee’s 
probability of enrolling himself or another family member in the SEHP could change. 
Polsky (2004) has shown that employees with health benefits chose an alternative source, 
such as a spouse or a public program, when there were outside options with near equal 
benefits but lower premiums. Given that our inclusion criteria require two years of 
continuous enrollment, we believe that if members had a more attractive and affordable 
outside option, then they would enroll in the alternative choice. Thus, the inability to 
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determine other sources of coverage is not a theoretically strong limitation but deserves 
mentioning. Given the data available we constructed the best choice model.  
In the inpatient context, we fail to reject the plan selection hypothesis that 
frequent utilizers of care will select the more generous plans because those with a greater 
number of hospital days were significantly more likely to select the Plus plan. In the 
outpatient context, the plan selection hypothesis is rejected because those with more total 
office use did not have a greater predicted probability of selecting a generous plan than 
those with less total office use. Unlike inpatient utilization, the level of office use does 
not seem to have an effect on plan selection in either of the two study populations. The 
lack of observed differences in plan selection by office use suggests that office utilization 
may not be as strong of a predictor of health plan selection as inpatient use.  
Lastly, members with a chronic condition had greater predicted probability of 
selecting the generous PPO Plus benefit than the non-chronic population. The high 
probability of Plus plan choice among members with hypertension and diabetes suggests 
that adverse selection is exhibited to some extent in the state health plan. The premium 
increase simulations indicate that adverse selection may be attenuated if premium price in 
the Plus plan is increased because movement out of the Plus plan and into the second 
most generous plan is likely to occur. A growing trend among large employers is to 
increase the employee OOP price of the premium (e.g. a form of cost-shifting) as one 
strategy to cover the rising costs of health insurance (KFF, 2009). Employers considering 
increasing the price of premium should expect to see the greatest percent of plan 
switching to occur among employees leaving the highest OOP priced premium plan and 
enrolling into the second highest OOP price premium plan.  
  
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
THE EFFECT OF PPO DESIGN ON UTILIZATION AND PAYMENTS  
 
A. Literature Review and Hypothesis  
 
Since 2000, Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs) have surpassed Health 
Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) as the most popular health benefit option offered by 
employers and the most frequently selected benefit by employees (Hurley, Shrunk, and 
White, 2004). PPO products are plans that offer access to a contracted network of providers 
and incentives to use that network. The PPO design is attractive to both employees and 
employers because it is assumed to offer more choice of providers, have fewer restrictive 
features for consumers, and lower administrative cost to employers (Hurley, Shrunk, and 
White, 2004). Traditional HMOs are different from PPOs because HMOs have physician 
gatekeepers who define patient access to health care resources which is often perceived as a 
restriction by consumers (Polsky and Nicholson, 1986; Scanlon, 1997). Traditional FFS plans 
are different from PPOs because they often lack the contracted discounts available to the 
employer groups who get their employees to use PPO-network care (Hurley et al, 2004). 
Despite the popularity of the PPO in the employer-sponsored market, it is still unclear in the 
literature as to whether adoption of the PPO offers any real value (Greenberg, 2001; Hurley, 
Shrunk, and White, 2004). Evidence of real value can be (1) cost savings for the employer in 
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the form of reductions in average third-party payments per enrollee or (2) efficient 
management of health services utilization by enrollees Greenberg, 2001; Gold et al, 
2003).  
The objective of this research is to obtain the effect of PPO benefit design on total 
member utilization and total third-party payments, separately from that which is due to 
self-selection. The research question of interest is: How much more total utilization and 
third-party payments do the benefits with low cost-sharing requirements have relative to 
the benefits with higher cost-sharing requirements? This study offers new empirical 
insight on the affect of tiered PPO benefits to a group of state employees offered a 
combination of premium free and OOP premium required products. Policymakers and 
benefit managers making decision for their respective state employee health plan can use 
these results to inform which future PPO benefit designs are likely to contain enrollees’ 
health services utilization and the state’s third-party payments.  The study findings are 
most applicable to other state employee health plans given that 39 out of the 50 state 
employee health plans are self- funded groups, like the NC SEHP, that generate funds for 
coverage through state taxes and employee OOP premiums (HRET, 2003). However, the 
study findings could also be applied to other large public or private employer groups 
similar in size, average education attainment, and health composition, such as members 
of the federal employees’ health plan (Wei, Ellis, Ash, and 2001).  
From an empirical perspective, the use of a two-stage residual inclusion (2SRI) 
equation will serve as another health econometric application of IV estimation for 
endogenous insurance choice variables in a non- linear model (Terza et al, 2009). 
Previous studies have examined the effect of endogenous health insurance choice 
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variables in non- linear models using other methods such as fixed-effects (Angrist, 1999; 
Baicker and Chandra, 2006), but few published applications of the 2SRI approach are 
available (Terza et al, 2009; Deb and Trivedi, 2007).   
The popularity of the PPO in the employer-sponsored market during the post-
managed care era is a result of the supposed cost savings obtained under the PPO cost 
containment design (Gruber and Washington, 2005; Hurley 2002). Cost savings for 
employers offering PPOs can be achieved administratively by joining contracted 
networks that offer negotiated discounts to employers who get their employees to use in-
network providers. Several studies have examined the extent to which employers have 
been able to achieve cost savings for themselves or at least contain costs by offering the 
PPO (Wouters, 1990; Greenberg, 2001; Hurley, Shrunk, and White, 2004). However, the 
empirical work to-date provides contradictory results on savings achieved post-PPO 
selection by employees. For instance, in 1990 Dean Smith conducted a study on a sample 
of 1,977 U.S. companies, most of them mid-sized, which offered a PPO. Adjusting for 
self-selection, Smith’s results revealed that on average, PPOs were associated with cost 
savings of 12% per covered life [(CI=7.2 to 16.9)] as compared to traditional plans with 
utilization review (Smith, 1998). Smith claims that the source of cost savings was 
primarily through the lower utilization rates under the PPO (Smith, 1998). Contrary to 
Smith’s findings, Bamezai and colleagues (1999) conducted a time-series analysis that 
found that PPOs achieved little-to-no cost savings. In fact, they concluded that HMOs 
contained cost growth more effectively than PPOs (Bamezai, 1999). We note that there 
were methodological differences between the two studies which may explain why the 
different conclusions were reached. For instance, Smith applied a two-part model with a 
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logged dependent variable to cross-sectional data in order to estimate costs savings. 
Bamezai used a fixed-effect analysis on a panel data set to estimate savings over time 
from being continuously enrolled in a PPO. Despite the different methodologies, Smith’s 
and Bamezai’s studies are valid comparisons because they both evaluated PPOs in a 
privately- insured employer-sponsored group through a retrospective analysis.  
There are other studies from the individual and group markets that examine the 
effect of cost reductions due to the PPO benefit design (Zwanziger and Auerbach, 2001; 
Tumlinson et al, 1991).  But given that these previous studies measure cost savings 
differently, there is no clear consensus from the literature as to how much PPOs truly 
reduce costs. For instance, Lave and colleagues measure (1994) total PPO costs as total 
insurer payments for PPO enrollees, but Taylor and colleagues measure total PPO costs 
as insurer reimbursements plus patient out-of-pocket expenditures for PPO enrollees 
(1996). Our review of the literature on PPOs’ effect on employer and employee costs is 
best summed up by Zwanziger and Auerbach who argue that is sparse literature 
evaluating PPO performance (Zwanzinger and Auerback, 2001).  
 Further empirical exploration of PPOs’ effect on employees’ health service use, 
relative to their use when enrolled in alternative designs (e.g. HMO, FFS), is also needed. 
A large portion of the published work evaluating PPOs’ effect on general health services 
utilization has been conducted on adults enrolled in an individual commercial PPO or 
adults enrolled in Medicare-based PPO products (CMS, 2003; Gold, Achman, and 
Verdier, 2003). Less research is available on the effect of PPOs’ design on total health 
service use for employer-sponsored groups (Hurley, Shrunk, and White, 2004). Of those 
studies that have examined the relationship between PPO OOP discounts and utilization 
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among employees, few of them have attributed a change in employees’ health services 
utilization to the PPO design (Parente et. Al, 2004; Zwanziger et al, 1999). For instance, 
Zwanziger and colleagues (1999) used a single- firm’s employer-sponsored population to 
analyze changes in health services utilization during the first year of operation under the 
PPO. Using a multivariate regression model controlling for demographic and prior 
expenditure differences, he found that members’ utilization increased from the previous 
FFS year to the PPO year. Zwanziger suspects that the increase in utilization is largely 
due to the fact that younger employees and dependents were likely to switch to the PPO. 
Contrary to Zwanziger’s finding, Smith and colleagues found that employees who 
switched from FFS plan to a PPO plan had a 9.7% lower rate of physician office visits 
(p<0.01) and a 9.3% lower rate of hospital admissions (p<0.05) (Smith, 1998), 
controlling for self-selection. Smith and colleagues believe the lower admission rates 
were not a result of increased OOP cost-sharing payments, but instead were likely due to 
a reduction in the choice of available in-network providers. The inverse direction of the 
effect of PPOs on utilization between the two studies could be due to the fact that 
Zwanziger’s study controlled for prior year factors, such as a prior year’s total health 
expenditures, whereas Smith and colleagues did not include any prior year cost controls.  
Again, similar to previous PPO cost-containment empirical review, there are mixed 
results in the literature about the effect of PPO cost-sharing discounts on PPO enrollees’ 
total health services utilization.  
Results from this study will make an empirical contribution to national and state 
health policy regarding employer-sponsored coverage. Our work extends the employer-
sponsored insurance literature because it is an analysis of PPO performance in a state 
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employer-sponsored population. Previous studies on PPOs’ effect on utilization and 
expenditures in state employee populations have been on state employees affiliated with 
public universities. For instance, results are available on utilization rates post-PPO 
selection for state employees working at the University of Minnesota (Parente et. al, 
2004) and within the California University System (Buchmueller and Feldstein, 1996). 
However, no research is available on PPOs’ effect on utilization and expenditures for an 
entire group of state employees, regardless of the division of their employment with the 
state. Conducting health services research on a state employee population is important 
because 3.4 million state employees receive coverage through the state they work for and 
nearly half of all state employees are enrolled in a PPO (Kaiser, 2002).The ability to offer 
data-driven results on the effect of PPO benefit design for an entire state employee 
population will extend the employer-sponsored insurance literature.  
Secondly, there is no peer-reviewed literature providing evidence on the impact of the 
PPO plans on utilization and third-party payments since the implementation of the three 
PPOs to NC state employees. In July of 2007, an audit conducted by the NC Office of 
State Auditor revealed that the State Health Plan projected a loss of $264 to $280 million 
for fiscal year 2006-2007, the first year the PPOs were in existence (NC Office of State 
Auditor, 2007). However, the effect of PPO benefit design on members’ health services 
utilization and third-party payments, controlling for self-selection in the plan options, has 
not been published. Hence, a multivariate analysis producing the differential effect of 
benefit design on total utilization and costs between two comparable plans is useful to the 
NC General Assembly in future decisions around benefit design. Given that 38 of the 50 
health plans offer at least one or more PPO products, the results of this study can be 
  49 
generalizable to employee health plans throughout the country  that are similar in size and 
socio-demographic composition (HRET, 2003).  
Lastly, this study will provide another application of the two-stage residual inclusion 
(2SRI) framework to address the endogeneity of health insurance in non- linear models. 
There are a handful of studies in the health econometric literature that have estimated the 
treatment effect of an endogenous insurance variable using the IV method in the non-
linear context. Partha Deb and colleagues published a study that used the 2SRI approach 
to address selection bias in an explanatory insurance variable that was multinomial in 
nature (Deb et al, 2006). Terza and colleagues used a generic parametric framework to 
show that 2SRI is the only consistent IV estimation of causal effect in non- linear models 
(Terza et al, 2008). Given that our study seeks to address the endogeneity of health 
insurance in non- linear models, we will use the best method for IV estimation in non-
linear models available.  
The Aday and Anderson behavioral health model is the framework for this 
investigation (Andersen, 1995; Aday and Awe, 1997). This model suggests that 
predisposing (e.g. beliefs about personal health) and enabling (e.g. health services 
availability) factors influence the distribution of health services use in a specific 
population. In the current study, we believe predisposing factors and enabling factors will 
influence the amount of health services one consumes. Among the predisposing 
characteristics, demographic factors, such as age and gender, and health beliefs, such as 
knowledge of a diagnosed condition, serve as proxies for the enrollee about how much 
care they believe they will consume. Enabling factors must also be present for healthcare 
use to take place. These factors include health insurance, income, and a usual source of 
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care provider.  Members who believe they will need a certain amount of health services 
(predisposing factor) will be in insurance plans (enabling factor) that allow them to 
access the health services at the lowest possible OOP cost.  Thus, we hypothesize that the 
PPO Plus plan will produce higher mean office and inpatient utilization totals relative to 
the less generous Indemnity and PPO Basic plans’ utilization totals. Again, generous is 
defined as high-premium plans that have lower deductible, coinsurance, and copayment 
requirements compared to lower-premium plans with high cost-sharing requirements. The 
low OOP cost-sharing requirements of the Plus benefit may make accessing services less 
of a financial obstacle, and thus enrollment into a generous plan could result in more use 
of services.  
We argue that selection effect and variation in plans’ OOP requirements are two 
reasons for differences in health service use in the PPO Plus compared to other less 
generous plan options. For instance, state employees who believe their health or their 
dependents’ health is poor may be more likely to select the Plus plan (e.g. selection 
effect) because they are able to purchase more services at the lowest OOP cost-sharing 
amount (e.g. variation in OOP requirements). Empirical research has shown that enrollees 
in poor health are likely to consume more health services than enrollees in good health 
(Grazier et al, 1986; Goldman, Leibowitz, and Buchanan, 1998; Polsky and Nicholson, 
2004). Therefore, NC SEHP members in poor health may be more attracted to the 
generous plan because the OOP cost-sharing requirements for frequently using care are 
lower than what the OOP cost-sharing would be in a less generous plan.  Members with 
either a diagnosed severe condition (e.g. cancer) or members in the frequent utilization 
categories (e.g. 3 or more total hospital days), are identified as persons whose health is 
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likely to be poor for purposes of our study.  We note that the study population is mostly 
comprised of employees, so the members with poor health are likely to be dependents, 
not employees (Arrighi and Hertz, 1994).  
To build the utilization conceptual model we include the predisposing and 
enabling factors that will inform what health benefit will best cover an employee’s 
believed health service needs or the expected needs of the employee’s family as seen in 
Figure 8 below. The factors included under the enabling and predisposing headings are 
the actual explanatory variables used in the econometric model to estimate the effect of 
benefit design on utilization. A chart was created that classifies each one of the 
explanatory variables in the econometric model as an enabling or predisposing variable. 
Figure 8. Health Services Utilization Conceptual Model 
Post-Health Plan 
Selection
Utilization
Predisposing Factors
Diagnosed Illness or 
Disease, Prior-year 
Utilization, Family Size
Enabling  
Resource
Income &
Indemnity Benefit
Expected 
Level of 
Utilization 
Enabling  
Resource
Income & 
Basic Benefit 
Enabling  
Resource
Income & 
Standard Benefit 
Enabling  
Resource
Income & 
Plus Benefit 
 
The orange arrows at the bottom of the framework represent the health services 
utilization in the post-health plan selection period. The extensions of the utilization 
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arrows are greater in the Plus and Standard plans to indicate where we hypothesize 
greater utilization is likely to occur. Health services utilization, not the rate of diagnosis, 
is the key outcome being measured, but we note that the rate of diagnosis would likely be 
affected by insurance generosity because a byproduct of frequent provider service use is 
more diagnosis.  Again, controlling for non-random selection, the intuition is that greater 
service use occurs in the Plus and Standard plans because their benefit designs allow 
members to purchase more services at a lower OOP cost after exceeding the deductible. 
The utilization arrow associated with the Plus benefit is the longest to visually illustrate 
that more service use would occur in the most generous plan.  
Building upon the utilization conceptual framework, the predisposing and 
enabling factors that influence utilization should also drive the accumulation of third-
party payments since payments are a function of health services utilization. If an enrollee 
believes  his/her health status will require  him/her to use a certain level of services (e.g. 
predisposing factor), and the parsimonious insurance plan to meet those services is the 
Plus benefit (e.g. enabling factor), then the average total payments are likely to be highest 
in the Plus plan since utilization is highest in the Plus plan. This theorized state employee 
consumer behavior is commonly referred to in the economics literature as the law of 
demand (Morrisey, 2008). Nearly all health insurance studies both retrospective and 
prospective in nature have found some degree of price responsiveness by consumers 
(Newhouse et al, 1981; Brook et al, 1983; Scanlon, 1997). Based on such previous 
studies, we postulate that NC SEHP members are more likely to use services, and thus 
accrue more third-party payments, under the Plus plan because it is the most generous 
cost-sharing option. That is, the Plus plan’s OOP price of accessing care, after exceeding 
  53 
the deductible, is significantly lower than the OOP requirements in the other plans, so 
Plus plan enrollees may use care more because of the lower OOP costs resulting in more 
third-party payments. Adding to the study’s conceptual model, the dollars located in the 
boxes represent the hypothesized level of mean total third-party payments for each plan 
as seen below in Figure 9.   
 
 
 
Figure 9. Third-Party Payments Conceptual Model 
Predisposing Factors
Diagnosed Illness or 
Disease, Prior-year 
Utilization, Family Size
Enabling  
Resource
Income &
Indemnity Benefit
Expected 
Level of 
Utilization 
Enabling  
Resource
Income & 
Basic Benefit 
Enabling  
Resource
Income & 
Standard Benefit 
Enabling  
Resource
Income & 
Plus Benefit 
Indemnity 
Mean Total
Third-Party 
Payments
$$$ Basic Plan
Mean Total 
Third-Party 
Payments
$$ Standard Plan 
Mean Total 
Third-Party 
Payment
$$$
$
Plus Plan Mean 
Total Third-
Party Payment
$$$
$$$
 
The dollar signs in each box are included to reflect where the most third-party payments 
are expected to occur based on benefit generosity. The third-party payment component in 
the framework should visually portray that as benefit generosity increases in each plan, so 
does the number of associated post-PPO third-party payment totals. In the health services 
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utilization conceptual framework we explain that the more generous benefit designs 
would have a higher utilization than the less generous plans. Now the conceptual model 
reflects the hypothesis that third-party payments totals will be greater in the PPO Plus.  
 
B. Benefit Design Measures 
The study setting is the North Carolina State Employees and Teachers’ Health 
Plan (NC SEHP). The NC SEHP claims from 2005 to 2007 represent the data source. The 
SEHP data set is a panel data set comprised of each claim type: inpatient claims, 
outpatient claims, pharmacy claims, professional claims, and member information. The 
study sample consists of non-retired, state employees and their enrolled family members 
who were continuously enrolled in the NC SEHP from October 1, 2005 to September 31, 
2007 and were not simultaneously enrolled in Medicare(N=300,048 members). We 
excluded members who were classified as retired because retired SEHP members have 
different OOP contribution requirements than the OOP requirements of non-retired, 
working state employees. Members enrolled in the SEHP and receiving Medicare are also 
excluded from the data set because the availability of an alternative subsidized covera ge 
option may mute the response of dually enrolled SEHP enrollees.  
Health insurance choice is endogenous with the outcomes of health service use 
and third-party payments. Therefore, instrumental variable (IV) analysis was employed to 
address endogeneity in this study since IVs permit causal inferences with observational 
data (Kennedy, 2003).  The two-stage residual inclusion (2SRI) approach was used to 
obtain a consistent estimate of betas because it instruments the endogenous health 
insurance variable in a non- linear model. 2SRI accomplishes this by including the 
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residuals from the first-stage equation into the second-stage equation of interest, in which 
case the included residuals serve as substitutes for the unobserved confounders believed 
to be driving the endogeneity. Other non- linear IV techniques such as two-stage predicted 
substitution (2SPS) have been used (Meer and Rosen, 2004; Bollen, Guilkey, and Mroz, 
1995), but we did not consider using 2SPS because 2SRI is the only consistent IV 
technique in non-linear models (Terza et al, 2009). The success of any instrumental 
variable analysis is dependent on how well the IV candidate is correlated with the 
endogenous insurance variable and uncorrelated with the outcome of interest. Thus, 
before discussing the application of 2SRI in this study, it is first necessary to identify an 
instrumental variable candidate that meets the good IV requirements.   
 Several IV candidates were considered from previously published literature where 
the outcome is health care utilization and the endogenous variable is health plan choice. 
For instance, occupational establishment size was used as an IV for a study examining 
the presence of plans’ gatekeeper requirements on the outcome of mammogram 
utilization for women enrolled throughout various employer-sponsored plans (Liang, 
Phillips, and Wang, 2004). Specifically, Liang and colleagues argued that occupational 
size would be a strong predictor of being in a plan with gatekeeper requirements, but not 
a predictor (conditional on other control variables) of mammogram screening preferences 
(2004). In another study, Shen and colleagues used the percentage of people with no 
insurance in the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) as an instrumental variable for 
insurance status that did not directly affect use of care (Shen et al, 2008). While both of 
these IVs were appropriate for their respective studies, we argue that neither IVs are 
theoretically valid instruments for this analysis. For instance, occupational size would be 
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theoretically invalid because there is only one employer group studied, so there would be 
no variation in the occupational size IV.  Shen and colleagues’ use of MSA as an IV 
would also be invalid because all state employees in the study sample have access to 
insurance that does not require any premium contribution; thus, the percentage of 
uninsured people within an MSA should have no effect on the insurance status of full-
time state employees.  
The preferred IV for this study is the division of state employment. The 
employment division construct represents the division or department within the state 
where the employee is employed. For instance, judges are employed under the Judicial 
Department and state highway maintenance workers are employed under the Department 
of Transportation. The member demographics file provided the employment location 
information. The 13 employment divisions used for the employment IV construct are as 
follows: (1) Kindergarten through 12-Grade Public Schools, (2) The University of North 
Carolina System, (3) Community Colleges, (4) The Department of Corrections, (5) The 
Department of Transportation, (6 )The Judicial Department, (7) The UNC hospital 
System, (8) Specialty NC hospitals (e.g. Dorthia Dix), (9) The NC Department of Health 
and Human Services, (10) Dept of Environment & Natural Resources,  (11) Law 
enforcement,  (12) The Office of State Retiree, and (13) Other State Employment 
Divisions.  
The criteria for a good IV are that (1) the IV is directly related to the endogenous 
variable and (2) the IV has no direct effect on the outcome variable. The theoretical basis 
for using the division of employment variable is that there are underlying social 
similarities between employees in a given employment division that may influence 
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choice. The social learning aspect of working alongside occupational colleagues may lead 
to an observed similarity in the health plan decisions of employees working in a similar 
industry but have no direct effect on utilization. For example, primary and secondary 
education school teachers, uncertain about the relative payoffs of the available health 
plan options, may draw inferences about plan qualities by observing the plan choices of 
their coworkers (IV requirement one). However, other factors about the primary and 
secondary education workplace environment such as teacher instruction, end-of-year 
grade reporting, and student counseling should not directly affect public school teachers’ 
health care utilization (IV requirement two). Thus, the division of employment variable in 
theory meets the two general IV requirements.  
Previous work by Alan Sorenson using data from five University of California 
(UC) campuses, demonstrated the relationship between social learning and health plan 
choice. Sorenson’s study showed that when controlling for employee characteristics (e.g. 
age, race, sex), insurance choices of employees in the same departments were similar 
even across different job positions within each department (Sorenson, 2001). Findings 
from his study suggest that employees’ health plan decisions may be influenced at some 
level by interactions and conversations with coworkers (i.e. peer influence). We believe 
the workplace effect on plan choice that occurred within UC academic departments also 
occurs among state employees who work within similar state divisions. Extending the 
generalizability of Sorenson’s finding from academic departments to broader, 
occupational divisions within the state, is a notable theoretical limitation. For instance, 
employees at East Carolina University may not communicate or share the same sentiment 
about health benefits with employees at Western Carolina University.  
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Another theoretical limitation of the proposed IV is that aspects of the workplace 
may cause health service use, thus violating the criteria that the IV has no direct effect on 
the outcome.  For instance, state highway maintenance employees spend a significant 
portion of their time on highways constructing and repairing roads.  Their workplace 
environment makes them susceptible to illness due to working in extremely hot 
temperatures at times. As a result, state highway maintenance employees could be more 
prone to using health care services due to their unfavorable working conditions. If this 
state highway worker scenario were true, then the employment division would not be a 
good IV because it would have a direct relationship on health services utilization. In 
response to the theoretical limitations of the proposed IV, three specification tests were 
conducted to statistically support using employment division as the IV.  
The three tests for a good IV are strength, exogeneity, and exclusion validity. To 
test for strength, an F-test was conducted and the null hypothesis was that the IV 
construct has no significant explanatory power in the first-stage equation. The F-test 
rejected the null hypothesis (Prob > F= 0.00), indicating that the IV strength test passed. 
To test for exogeneity a Hausman test was performed. The Hausman test null hypothesis 
was that βOLS and β2 SLS estimates are asymptotically equal. The null hypothesis was 
rejected (Prob>chi2=0.00), concluding that endogeneity exists and therefore the IV 
should be used. A test for exclusion validity was not performed because the model is 
exactly identified since we have one IV and one endogenous variable. Given the results 
of the IV specification tests, occupational division was an acceptable IV.  
The two outcomes of interest are total member utilization and the state’s total 
third-party payments accumulated in the first year the PPO plans were available. We first 
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discuss the construction of the two utilization models. In the first utilization model, total 
hospital days are the dependent variable and in the second utilization model, total number 
of office visits is the dependent variable. The key explanatory variables of interest in both 
the inpatient and office utilization models are the four health plans (e.g. Indemnity and 
three PPOs). 
The effect of PPO benefit design on total inpatient and office utilization is 
estimated on two different study populations: (1) the first study population consist of 
members with employee-only coverage and (2) the second study population consist of 
members with employee plus dependent coverage. Two sets of estimates are necessary 
because the premiums and deductibles are vastly different between the employee-only 
coverage and the family coverage groups. For instance, under the PPO Plus plan 
members with employee-only coverage had a $150 deductible. But members in the 
family plan had a cumulative $450 deductible which had to be paid before each family 
member had no deductible requirement. Therefore, members with employee-only 
coverage may use services differently than those in family plans because of upfront OOP 
costs. 
 We used a slightly different set of demographic covariates in the employee only 
model. A variable for the age and gender of the primary subscriber is included in the 
employee-only utilization models to adjust for demographic differences. In the employee 
plus dependents utilization models, controls for age and gender are not included because 
at the family- level the age and gender of the primary subscriber is not representative of 
the entire family. However, the employee plus dependent coverage samples had family 
size and type of dependent coverage indicator variables. Given that the utilization totals 
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can vary based on the number of family members covered under the plan, it was 
necessary to include a family size variable. Additionally, the level of utilization may 
differ across families based on the variation in cost-sharing requirements of the 
dependent coverage option. Therefore, binary variables for spousal coverage, children 
coverage, and family coverage (e.g. spouse and children) were included as controls in the 
employee plus dependent coverage utilization models.  
 The last two variable constructs included in the utilization models were the 
CDPS-based co-morbidity indicators and median household income (MHI). The prior 
year diagnoses incdicator variables are included as proxies to control for variation in 
member health status. Area median household income was included as a proxy for family 
income. Both variables were constructed and included in the same fashion as they were in 
the plan selection model using CDPS’s identified ICD-9 codes for diagnosis (Kronick, 
2003) and Claritas’ data for MHI values. There were 14 co-morbidity indicators included 
that represented a classification category of diagnosis obtained in the pre-PPO coverage 
year. 
 The last econometric model of interest was the model where the dependent 
variable was total third-party payments. The same set of explanatory variables in the 
utilization models above was also included in the third-party payment model. All 
payments made by the state to cover allowed reimbursement for members’ health care 
services provided in inpatient and outpatient settings represent the third-party payment 
total. Included are payments for facility services (e.g. hospital, ER, MRI machine use) 
and professional provider services (e.g. physicians, chiropractors, therapists, lab work 
and testing). The means and standard deviations of the dependent and explanatory 
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variables used in the utilization and third-party payment models for both study 
populations are provided below in Table 9. 
          Table 9. Descriptive Statistics of Variables Used in the Utilization & Third-Party Payment      
           Models     
   
Subsample of 
Employee-Only 
Coverage 
 
Mean (SD) 
N=176,010  
Employees 
Subsample of 
Family Coverage 
 
 
Mean (SD) 
N=40,475 
Families 
Plan Choice Variables    
  Indemnity Plan Selected  24.0%  16.5% 
  PPO Basic Plan Selected   3.0%  6.3% 
  PPO Standard Plan Selected  59.1%  61.2% 
  PPO Plus Plan Selected  13.9%  16.8% 
Utilization and Costs Metrics of Interest     
 Average Total Inpatient Days  0.3 (2.1)  0.5 (6.7) 
 Average Total Office Visits 
Average Number of 30-Day Rx. Fills 
Average Total Third-Party Payment 
  
6.1 (9.3) 
8.3 (5.4) 
$ 3,794.21 
($8,584)  
11.1 (12.3) 
15.7 (12.1) 
$6,138.10 
($14,097) 
Health Plan Related Variables    
 Avg. Out-of-Pocket Premium Per Family  
 
~ 
~  
$243.02 
(67.12) 
  Employee-Only Coverage 100%  ~ 
  Employee and Spouse Coverage ~  13.1% 
  Employee and Child Coverage ~  66.1% 
  Employee, Spouse, and Child Coverage ~  20.8% 
Co-morbidity Indicators     
 Hypertension       16.6%  22.4% 
 Diabetes   15.1%  9.3% 
 Mental Illness 14.9%  12.6% 
 Back Pain  11.3%  12.6% 
 Asthma          8.1%  7.9% 
 Non-back Skeletal         4.8%  9.2% 
 Chronic Obstructive pulmonary disease     2.4%                 7.2% 
 Cancer       2.2%  8.2% 
 Cardiovascular Disease      1.7%  9.8% 
 Epilepsy       3.1%  2.4% 
Other Diagnosed Conditions**      2.7%  4.9% 
Disorders of the Eye           2.2%  2.6% 
Pregnancy      2.1%  1.7% 
Chronic Liver Disease       1.0%  1.3% 
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Socio-demographic Variables      
Average Age      44.0 (10.6)  ~ 
Percent Male     29%  ~ 
Average Family Size   ~  2.8 (2.3) 
Median Household Income 
   
$45,801.2 
(16,071.59)  
$46,106.88  
(16,143.16) 
Occupation Location Variables 
K-12 Public School Position   56.6%           64.2% 
UNC Higher Education System       13.6%  5.0% 
Law Enforcement    7.1%  9.5% 
Judicial Department   6.6%  2.2% 
NC Dept. of Health and Human Services   5.2%  4.3% 
Department of Transportation   4.0%  1.5% 
NC Community College System   3.8%  5.3% 
Office of State Retiree Services   1.9%  0.3% 
Department of Corrections   1.2%  2.1% 
UNC Hospital System   1.3%  3.1% 
Environment & Natural Resources   1.2%  0.4% 
Specialty NC Hospitals(ex. Dorthia Dix)     1.1%  0.1% 
Other State Employment Division ***   1.3%  2.1% 
 
Likelihood-ratio (LR) tests were performed on the first stage equation in order to 
determine which functional form of the explanatory variables was more appropriate to 
use over alternative functional forms. Three candidates for the functional form of office-
based use in the baseline year were considered: (1) the continuous form of total office-
based use (Log likelihood=-21,274), (2) the continuous and quadratic form (Log 
likelihood=-21,149), and (3) six subjectively created office use binary categories (Log 
likelihood=-21,053). The LR tests suggested the six office utilization categories (p<0.01) 
were the preferred specification. 
The LR test was also conducted on measures of inpatient utilization in the 
baseline year.  Given the skeweness of the inpatient distribution as seen in Appendix 3, 
we did not rely on the percentile method for constructing the total inpatient days 
functional form because it suggested we stratify persons with low inpatient utilizations 
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into one group. Thus, we would’ve erroneously put members with one to four total 
inpatient days into the same inpatient use indicator variable (e.g. 1to4 inpatient use), even 
though an enrollee with four inpatient days is likely not similar to a person with one 
inpatient day. Instead, three binary categories were created to reflect the three levels of 
inpatient use. For example, 84% of families had zero inpatient length of stays and thus a 
zero inpatient days binary variable was created. A handful of families (6%) had one or 
two inpatient days and thus a 1 to 2 inpatient day binary variable was created to capture 
those short, one-time stays. Lastly, four percent of the sample had three or more than total 
inpatient days and thus it made sense to create a binary variable representing those with 
multiple hospital days. The LR test supported the use of three binary inpatient use 
categories (Log likelihood=-21,187) over the continuous form (Log likelihood=-21,514) 
(p<0.01). The three inpatient indicator levels were also preferred over the continuous and 
quadratic form of inpatient use (Log likelihood=-21,438) (p<0.01). Lastly, the LR test 
supported the use of three binary inpatient use categories over four binary inpatient use 
categories (Log likelihood=-21,254) (p<0.01), where the fourth category represented high 
inpatient use outliers. 
An LR test was also performed on the IV construct to determine if the first stage 
equation would better explain variation in Y with 12 employment division binary 
variables over pooling the occupational location variables into 9 categories. The LR test 
favored including all of 12 employment division variables (Log likelihood=-20,827) over 
only including 9 employment division variables (Log likelihood=-21,016) (p<0.00). 
Several F-tests were conducted to confirm whether inclusion of demographic 
constructs such as diagnosed condition, age, and family size had any explanatory power. 
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The F-test on the diagnosed condition dummies tested whether the health status construct 
matters. The null hypothesis was the coefficients on the diagnosed condition binary 
variables were jointly equal to zero. The F-test rejected the hypothesis (p<0.01), which 
means that the diagnosed condition dummies are jointly significant and can be included 
in the choice model in their proposed binary form. An F-test on age and age-squared was 
performed to see if the age variables in the model had any significant explanatory power. 
The F-test again rejected (p<0.05) the null hypothesis that age and age-squared are equal 
to zero and thus age and age-squared were included in the employee-only models. For the 
employee plus family coverage model, we compared the continuous, quadratic, and 
categorical form of the family size variable. The LR test was statistically significant 
suggested the categorical form (Log likelihood=-21,394) of the family size variable be 
used over the continuous (Log likelihood=-22,061) (p<0.01) and the quadratic form (Log 
likelihood=-21,417) (p<0.05). 
 
C. Methods and Results of Modeling the Effect of Benefit Design Utilization and 
Costs 
A count data model was used to estimate the effect of benefit design on mean 
total office visits. The total office use histogram, as seen in Appendix 4, shows that there 
is a non-normal office use distribution. The graph also reveals that most families had 
between 1 to 20 total office visits and then there is a sharp decline in the number of 
families with more than 20 office visits.  Given the distribution of the data, a series of 
specification tests were performed to determine which of the non- linear count models 
would be most appropriate. The first test compared the Poisson regression model versus 
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the Standard Negative Binomial Model using an LR test.  We rejected the null that the 
variance equals the mean (p<0.05). A second test was performed comparing the Standard 
Negative Binomial to the Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial (ZINB) using a Vuong test 
(Vuong, 1988). The Vuong test favored the Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial model (pr>z 
= 0.042). 
The key methodological decision for the office utilization model was whether to 
use the two-stage predicted substitution approach or use a two-stage residual inclusion 
(2SRI) approach to address the endogenous health insurance choice variable. We decided 
to use 2SRI because it is the only consistent IV estimator in non- linear models (Terza et 
al, 2009).  A secondary reason for using 2SRI is because it allows us to obtain coefficient 
estimates on the health plan indictors of interests (e.g. Basic, Standard, and Plus), but the 
2SLS equation does not. Therefore, to estimate the effect of benefit design on office 
utilization, adjusting for the endogeneity of the health plans and the count nature of the 
total office visits distribution, a 2SRI-ZINB was estimated.  
The coefficients from the 2SRI-ZINB model showed that the health plan 
indicators for the Basic, Standard, and Plus plans were all statistically significant 
(p<0.01), when using robust standard errors as seen in Appendix 10. Of the three health 
plan indicators, the Plus plan had the largest positive effect (β=0.26) compared to the 
Indemnity plan than the Basic (β=-0.64) and Standard (β=-0.37) had. Meaning, if a 
enrollee in the Plus plan and an enrollee in the Indemnity plan (referent plan) had more 
than zero visits, and also had identical characteristics such as age, gender, and diagnosis; 
the expected number of office visits for the Plus plan enrollee would be 1.2 times the 
expected number of total office visits for the similar member in the Indemnity plan (exp 
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(0.26) =1.2). We also found that all diagnosis indicator variables were statistically 
significant (p<0.05) except for asthma and pregnancy, when using robust standard errors. 
The robust application was necessary in order to obtain correct standard errors because 
there is often non-normality in non-linear model’s original standard errors, causing them 
to be large and invalid (Wooldridge, 2006).  
To test our hypothesis about the effect of benefit design on total office utilization, 
we calculated the differential effect between the plans on total office use. To determine if 
the differential effect was statistically significant we applied the bootstrapped technique 
to get correct standard errors and then obtained the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles to form a 
non-parametric confidence interval at the 95% level. The bootstrapping technique is 
commonly used for generating unbiased standard errors in non- linear models (Goldman, 
1995; Thorpe and Howard, 2003). The reported bootstrapped results to test the hypothesis 
that the plans with lowest cost-sharing amounts are likely to have the highest utilization 
totals are below in Table 10 for the employee-only study population and Table 11 for the 
employee plus dependents study population.  
Table 10. Differential Effect of Benefit Design on Total Office Visits for the Employee-Only 
Study Population 
 
Plan 
Type 
Predicted number of 
   office visits, 
controlling for non-
random selection 
Difference in the 
predicted  number of 
office visits between 
Indemnity and 
indicated PPO plan 
Statistically 
significant 
difference from 
Indemnity 
predicted total 
 
Bootstrapped 
(95%CI) 
Indemnity 6.2 ~ ~ ~ 
Basic 5.7 0.5 fewer visits Not Significant (-0.61 to 
0.11) 
Standard 5.5 0.7 fewer visits Not Significant (-0.84 to 
0.06) 
Plus 7.3 1.3 more visits Significant (1.22 to 
1.47) 
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When controlling for non-random selection, we find that the predicted number of 
office visits for an employee with employee-only coverage in the Indemnity plan was 6.2, 
in the Basic plan was 5.7, in the Standard plan was 5.5, and in the Plus plan was 7.3 as 
seen in Table 9. Our study shows that if four different state employees with identical 
characteristics (e.g. same age, gender, health status, income) were randomly placed in 
each of the four health plans, the member in the Plus and the Indemnity plan would have 
the highest predicted number of total office visits. These predictions are representative of 
an average state employee in the sample considered to be in good health (i.e., zero 
inpatient days, 44 years of age, male, and no prior year diagnosed condition between 
2005 and 2006, and an MHI between $31,000 and $50,000). When we changed the 
prediction to represent an employee in poor health, by replacing zero inpatient days three 
or more inpatient days, the predicted numbers of total office visits results were similar.  
Table 11. Differential Effect of Benefit Design on Total Office Visits for the Employee-Only  
Plus Dependents Study Population 
 
Plan 
Type 
Predicted number of 
office visits, 
controlling for non-
random selection 
Difference in the 
predicted  number 
of office visits 
between Indemnity 
and indicated PPO 
plan 
Statistically 
significant 
difference 
from 
Indemnity 
predicted total 
 
Bootstrapped 
(95%CI) 
Indemnity 13.7 ~ ~ ~ 
Basic 10.1 3.6 fewer office 
visits 
Significant (-3.81 to -
3.25) 
Standard 13.0 0.7 fewer office 
visits 
Not Significant (-0.82 to 
0.12) 
Plus 15.5 1.8 more office 
visits 
Significant (1.53 to 1.97) 
 
Consistent with the employee-only population results, we find the highest 
predicted number of total office visits, relative to the Indemnity plan, occurred for 
families in the Plus plan. When controlling for non-random selection, the predicted 
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number of total office visits for families was 13.7 in the Indemnity plan, 10.1 in the Basic 
plan, 13.0 visits under the Standard plan, and 15.5 in the Plus plan. The differential effect 
of having nearly two more office visits in the Plus plan compared to the Indemnity plan 
was statistically significant at the 5% level;  suggesting that we fail to reject the 
generosity hypothesis because the highest predicted number of total office visits occurred 
in the most generous plan. The Basic plan relative to the Indemnity plan likely had the 
lowest predicted total office use because it was the plan with the highest cost-sharing 
provisions for accessing care; so Basic-enrolled families may have been judicious with 
their health service use because of the relative high OOP costs. Although insignificant, 
the Indemnity plan had slightly higher predicted total office use in then the Standard 
plan’s predicted total office use. This is inconsistent with the hypothesized cost-sharing 
effect on office use because the plan with the third-ranked OOP cost-sharing provision 
(e.g. Indemnity), seems to have the second highest total office use predicted. Reasons for 
the inconsistent finding are shared in the discussion section.  
These estimates are based on a prediction of an average family in the sample 
considered to be in good health; defined as families with zero inpatient days, a family 
with no prior year diagnosed conditions, three family members covered under the NC 
SEHP, and an MHI value between $31,000 and $50,000. When calculating the prediction 
for families in poor health (i.e., families with a hypertension diagnosis and > 3 total 
hospital day), each of the predicted number of office visits increase by at least 1.1 visit. 
None of the increases were statistically significant at the 5% level. However, the Plus and 
Indemnity plans in the poor health family predictions were still the two benefits with the 
leading predicted number of total office visits.  
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To test the effect of the benefit design on total inpatient days, we needed to 
consider which econometric model was most appropriate given that 84% of the sample 
had zero total hospital days.  The histogram of total inpatient days per member indicates 
that there was a non-normal distribution as seen in Appendix 5. Consideration was first 
given to logging the dependent variable because there were 12 families who had between 
120 to 143 total inpatient days; making the inpatient dependent variable have an 
extremely long right tail. Families with 120 to 143 total inpatient days were valid outliers 
and were not a result of coding errors. For instance, one family with a total of 143 
inpatient days had a child with a primary diagnosis of complicated bone marrow 
transplant and a secondary diagnosis of leukemia. We did not exclude the total inpatient 
days’ outliers and therefore the inpatient variable had a range similar to that of a 
continuous variable. If we assume that the total inpatient days’ variable is continuous, 
and we know it is distribution is skewed, then a transformation of the continuous total 
inpatient days’ variable can produce errors that are approximately normal. However, if 
the total inpatient days’ variable is really more of a count variable and not continuous in 
nature, then a simple transformation cannot produce normally distributed errors 
(Kennedy, 2006). 
The decision to transform the inpatient use dependent variable was based on 
results from the Wooldridge R2-like test and a histogram of plotted residuals 
(Wooldridge, 2006). The Wooldridge R2-like tests favored the unlogged continuous total 
inpatient days dependent variable over the logged form (Unlogged R2=0.037 vs. Logged 
R2=0.029).  We also produced histograms of the plotted residuals to alleviate any 
concerns one may have about relying on the Wooldridge R2- like test. The histogram of 
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the residuals is another technique to informally identify if we have a normally distributed 
error term. Even after logging the total inpatient days dependent variable, there was still a 
non-normal distribution of the residuals in the logged inpatient model. Logging did help 
some with the skeweness, but not enough to provide convincing evidence to overturn our 
original decision to not log hospital days. Given the results of the Wooldridge test and the 
histograms, the unlogged total inpatient days dependent variable was used in a count 
model.  
The next battery of specification tests determined which count data model from 
the count family should be used. The Poisson regression model was compared to the 
Negative Binomial Model using an LR test on the inpatient utilization second-stage 
equation. The LR test rejected the null of a Poisson distribution (p<0.05) and a 
subsequent Vuong test was performed comparing the Negative Binomial to the Zero-
Inflated Negative Binomial (Vuong, 1988). The Vuong test favored the Zero-Inflated 
Negative Binomial model (pr>z =0.00) as seen in Table 12 below. 
    Table 12. Total Hospital Days Count Model Specification Tests  
Nested Models Tested            Test Result Decision 
 
Poisson vs. Negative 
Binomial 
 
LR Test Result 
chibar2(01)= 1.6e05 p<0.01 
Reject the null 
hypothesis of a Possion 
distribution, meaning 
overdispersion exist. 
Then conduct one more 
test to confirm that NB is 
the right model choice 
 
 
Standard Negative 
Binomial vs. Zero-Inflated 
Negative Binomial 
 
Vuong Test Result 
z= 27.5  pr>z <0.01 
 
 
Reject SNB   and choose 
the ZINB. 
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 Based on these specification tests, we estimated the unbiased effect of benefit 
design on total inpatient days with a 2SRI-ZINB model with robust standard errors. The 
2SRI-ZINB model estimation was the estimate of choice because it accounts for the 
endogeneity of the health plans as well as count nature of the total hospital days 
dependent variable.  
Coefficients from the 2SRI-ZINB total inpatient days model showed that Basic, 
Standard, and Plus health plan indicators were all statistically significant (p<0.01) as seen 
in Appendix 6. Of the three health plan indicators, the Plus plan had the largest positive 
effect (β=0.03) relative to the Indemnity plan then the Basic (β=-0.19) and Standard (β=-
0.23) had. We also found that all diagnoses indicator variable coefficients were 
statistically significant (p<0.05) except for asthma.  
To test our hypothesis that the benefits with the lower cost-sharing requirements 
would have the highest total inpatient days, we calculated the differential effect between 
the health plans on total hospital days. To determine if the differential effect was 
statistically significant we applied the bootstrapped technique to get correct standard 
errors and then obtained the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles to form a non-parametric 
confidence interval at the 95% level.  
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        Table 13. Differential Effect of Benefit Design on Predicted Inpatient Use for the Employee- 
only coverage study population 
 
Plan 
Type 
Predicted number 
of total hospital 
days by plan type, 
controlling for non-
random selection 
Difference in the 
predicted  number of 
total days between 
Indemnity and 
indicated PPO plan 
Statistically  
significant 
difference from 
Indemnity 
predicted total 
 
Bootstrapped 
(95% CI) 
Indemnity 0.27 ~ ~  
Basic 0.23 0.04 fewer inpatient 
days 
Significant (-0.17 to -
0.02) 
Standard 0.22 0.05 fewer inpatient 
days 
Significant (-0.15 to -
0.01) 
Plus 0.26 0.01 more inpatient 
days 
Not Significant (-0.07 to 
0.04) 
 
Controlling for non-random selection, the predicted number of inpatient days 
under the Indemnity plan was 0.27, in the Basic plan was 0.23, in the Standard plan was 
0.22, and in the Plus plan was 0.26. The minimal effect of all four benefit designs on 
inpatient use is likely less than one because 84% of the sample had no hospital days. 
These results suggest that no one plan’s effect on inpatient utilization appeared to 
standout from the rest of the products offered.  Compared to the Indemnity plan, PPO 
plans are associated with a shorter number of inpatient days.  In fact, the Basic plan and 
the Standard plan had a statistically significant shorter number of total inpatient days than 
the Indemnity plan; however, the magnitude of this difference is small and thus offers 
little policy significance. 
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     Table 14. Differential Effect of Benefit Design on Inpatient Use for the Employee plus  
 dependents’ coverage study population 
 
Plan 
Type 
Predicted number 
of total hospital 
days by plan type, 
controlling for non-
random selection 
Difference in the 
predicted  number of 
total days between 
Indemnity and 
indicated PPO plan 
Statistically  
significant 
difference 
from 
Indemnity 
predicted total 
 
Bootstrapped 
(95% CI) 
Indemnity 0.36 ~ ~  
Basic 0.26 0.10 fewer inpatient 
days  
Significant (-0.37 to -
0.03)  
Standard 0.27 0.09 fewer inpatient 
days 
Significant (-0.26 to -
0.05)  
Plus 0.39 0.03 more inpatient 
days 
Not 
Significant 
(-0.06 to 
0.14) 
 
Controlling for non-random selection, the predicted number of total inpatient days 
for a family in the Indemnity plan was 0.36, in the Basic plan was 0.26, in the Standard 
plan was 0.27, and in the Plus plan was 0.39. The Basic and Standard plans were 
associated with a shorter number of total inpatient days when compared to the Indemnity 
plan and the fewer predicted days was statistically significant  (p<0.05).The greater 
predicted number of total hospital day in the Plus plan relative to families in the 
Indemnity plan was not statistically significant.  
In short, we reject the utilization hypothesis that the more generous benefits (e.g. 
Standard and Plus) would have the highest predicted utilization totals than the less 
generous benefits. We would only fail to reject the utilization hypothesis if both the Plus 
benefit and the Standard benefit had higher predicted utilization totals than the 
Indemnity, since those were the plans with the lowest cost-sharing provisions. As we 
expected, the most generous benefit, PPO Plus, had greater inpatient and office utilization 
totals than all other less generous benefits, controlling for non-random selection. 
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However, the primary unexpected result was that the Indemnity plan had higher predicted 
inpatient and office utilization totals than the Standard and Basic plans. The difference 
between the Indemnity utilization predicted totals relative to the Standard plan’s totals 
was statistically significant in many cases. Reasons for why predicted total utilization 
was high for members enrolled in the Indemnity plan is explored in the discussion 
section.   
A common feature of healthcare expenditure data is right-skeweness. The 
skeweness occurs in many cases because there are a small number of study participants 
responsible for a high proportion of the expenditures.  This study’s third-party payment 
distribution exhibits positive skweness because 15% of the sample had extremely high 
third-party payment totals, yet nearly half of the sample had zero or low third-payment 
totals. For instance, the percentile graph below shows that 85% of members had less than 
$10,000 in total third-party payments.  
Figure 10. Percentile Distribution of Third-Party Payment Totals 
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In response to the econometric issues associated with the skewed distribution of 
our third-party payment data, we used a two-part model because it is a common 
technique used by researchers when there are a cluster of zeros (Mullahy, 1998; 
Polhmeier and Ulrich, 1995). Even when the true model is a selection model, the two-part 
model still provides good estimates (Manning, Duan, and Rogers, 1987).  
The application of 2SRI was again chosen to address endogeneity since it is the 
only consistent IV estimator in non- linear models. Therefore, to estimate the effect of 
benefit design on third-party payments we used a 2SRI two-part model with an unlogged 
dependent variable. Specifically, the two-part model is estimated on the second stage 
equation with the included predicted residuals and all other exogenous variables.  
To obtain the expected value of third-party payments for each health plan we 
estimated the unconditional two-part model equation. The unconditional equation 
requires multiplying the probability of having any third-party payments (e.g. part one); 
times the marginal effect of the PPO plans conditional on having total third-party 
payments greater than $0.00 (e.g. part two).   
The linear probability model (LPM) was used to estimate the first part of the two-
part model because it provides an easier interpretation of the estimates since the predicted 
values are directly interpreted as probabilities.  However, one limitation of the LPM is 
that the unit interval can be outside of 0 and 1; in such cases the logit model is 
theoretically preferred. After running LPM on the first-part of the two-part model, results 
showed less than 10% of the predictions were outside zero and 1, providing one reason 
for choosing LPM over logit.  The second reason for choosing LPM was because the logit 
model dropped enrollees with 3 or more total inpatient days or 30 or more total office 
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visits, since all those enrollees had a paid claim (e.g. collinearity). Therefore, LPM was 
chosen as the preferred model for the first part of the two-part model. 
The Wooldridge R2-like test on the second part of the two-part model favored the 
unlogged third-party payment dependent variable over the logged third-party payment 
variable (Unlogged Pseudo R2=0.2589 vs. Logged Pseudo R2=0.2471). To further confirm 
the decision not to log, a histogram of the plotted residuals from the logged and unlogged 
models was produced. The plotted residuals from the logged third-party payment model 
showed that even after logging, the distribution of the predicted residuals was still non-
normal. The two sets of plotted residuals show that there isn’t a clear advantage, in the 
context of our study, for using a log distribution over an unlogged distribution. Thus, the 
Wooldridge R2-like results were used to support the decision not to log the payment 
dependent variable since the plotted residuals offered inconclusive evidence as to which 
approach to incorporate.  In short, to produce a consistent estimate of the effect of PPO 
benefit design on third-party payments, considering the endogenous health plan variable 
and skewed distribution of third-party payments, we estimated a 2SRI-2PM. A 
bootstrapping loop was applied to the full estimation of 2PM in order to obtain correct 
standard errors as seen in the coefficents provided in Appendix 7.  
Lastly, to test our hypothesis that of the three PPOs, the PPO Plus plan would 
have the highest predicted third-party payment total relative to the Indemnity; we 
estimated the differential effect of each PPO benefit design. To determine if the 
differential effect was statistically significant we applied the bootstrapped technique to 
get correct standard errors and then obtained the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles to form a 
non-parametric confidence interval at the 95% level. The bootstrapped differential effect 
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results for members with employee-only coverage and members with employee plus 
dependent coverage are reported below. 
     Table 15. Differential Effect of Benefit Design on Third-Party Payments for the Employee-only 
coverage Study Population 
 
Plan 
Type 
 
Predicted 
third-party 
payment 
total  
 
Differential effect of 
predicted total third-party 
payments between Indemnity 
and PPO plan 
Statistically  
significant 
difference from 
Indemnity 
predicted total 
 
Bootstrapped 
(95%CI) 
Indemnity $3,955.17 ~ ~ ~ 
Basic $2,862.51 State pays $1,092 less in 
Basic 
Significant (-1,231  to -
1,048) 
Standard $3,032.69 State pays $922 less in 
Standard 
Significant (-1,037  to -
893) 
Plus $4,315.37 State pays $360 more in Plus Significant (306 to 487) 
 
Controlling for non-random selection, the predicted number of total third-party 
payments in the Indemnity plan was $3,995, in the Basic plan was $2,862, in the 
Standard plan was $3,032, and in the Plus plan was $4,315. We reject the generosity 
hypothesis because the results show the state would pay $360 more in third-party 
payments for a state employee enrolled in the Plus plan than for a state employee enrolled 
in the less generous Indemnity plan (p<0.05).  
These third-party payment estimates are representative of an average state employee in 
the sample considered to be in good health (i.e. zero inpatient days, 6 to 15 office visits, 44 
years of age, male, and no history of a diagnosed condition between 2005 and 2006). To obtain 
estimates for a less healthy employee, we recalculated the prediction by replacing zero inpatient 
days with three or more inpatient days and replacing no diagnosis with hypertension diagnosis. 
The prediction for an employee in poor health showed that the Indemnity ($3,968.11) and PPO 
Plus plans ($4,341.51) had larger predicted total third-party payments than the Basic 
($2,857.18) and Standard plans ($3,015.67). The difference of $373 more under the Plus design 
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than the Indemnity design for a state employee in poor health  was statistically significant at the 
5% level [CI= (351 to 427)]. Thus, after controlling for non-random selection, the more 
generous PPO Plus design would have higher predicted total third-party payment values than 
the Indemnity design for employees in good and poor health as indicated by the predictions.  
             Table 16. Differential Effect of Benefit Design on Third-Party Payments for the Employee-only plus 
Dependents Coverage Study Population 
 
Plan 
Type 
 
Predicted 
third-party 
payment total  
 
Differential effect of 
predicted total third-party 
payments between 
Indemnity and PPO plan 
Statistically  
significant 
difference from 
Indemnity 
predicted total 
 
Bootstrapped 
(95%CI) 
Indemnity $3,552.73     ~ ~ ~ 
Basic $3,493.91      State Pays $59 less in 
Basic 
Not Significant (-88.27  to 
116.91) 
Standard $3,488.95     State Pays $64 less in 
Standard 
Not Significant (-74.31 to 
103.57) 
Plus $4,211.16     State Pays $658 more in 
Plus 
Significant (591.98 to 
728.64) 
 
Controlling for non-random selection in the employee plus dependent coverage 
sample, the predicted third-party payment total in the Indemnity plan was $3,552, in the 
Basic plan was $3,493, in the Standard plan was $3,488, and in the Plus plan was $4,211. 
These total payment predictions are representative of a family considered to be in good 
health as defined by families who had zero inpatient days, 6 to 15 office visits, no family 
member with a diagnosed condition between 2005 and 2006, a MHI value between 
$31,000 and $50,000, three total family members covered by the NC SEHP, and enrolled 
in a employee plus spouse plus children (e.g. family) coverage option. The differential 
effect results show that the state would spend $658 more for a family in good health 
under the Plus plan than if that family was enrolled in the Indemnity plan. This difference 
was statistically significant and supported our intuition that the most generous plan would 
have greater third-party payments than the less generous Indemnity plan.  
  79 
Given that hypertension was the most diagnosed condition in our study 
population, we also calculated a total third-party payment prediction for a family 
considered to be in poor health as defined as those with 1 to 2 total inpatient days, 16 to 
27 office visits, a family member with a prior year hypertension diagnosis, a MHI value 
between $31,000 and $500,000, three total family members covered by the NC SEHP, 
and enrolled in a employee plus spouse plus children (e.g. family) coverage option. The 
differential effect results show that the state would spend $1,059 more for a family in 
poor health under the Plus plan than if that family was enrolled in the Indemnity plan 
[CI= (927 to 1,183)]. This difference was statistically significant and further supported 
our intuition that the most generous plan would have greater third-party payments than 
the less generous Indemnity plan, for families considered to be in good and poor health. 
The Basic (state pays $162 less in Basic) and Standard (state plays $210 less in Standard) 
plans’ total costs predictions for family in poor health were both under $250 relative to 
the Indemnity plan; and the difference was statistically significant [Basic CI= (72 to 
214)] [Standard CI= (181 to 266)].  
 
D. Counterfactual Test for Selection Bias  
To determine if any selection bias remained in the model a counterfactual step 
was employed using members’ prescription drug data. Spec ifically, the 2SRI-ZINB 
model was re-estimated with total prescription drug use as the dependent variable, the 
health plan indicators as the key explanatory variables, the health plan indicators’ first-
stage residuals as the selection bias adjustments and all other socio-demographic 
covariates.  The null hypothesis was that the health plan predicted residuals will have 
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zero effect on the predicted number of total drug use because the first-stage residuals 
should be picking up only arbitrary noise and not any unobserved factors correlated with 
drug use. However, the health plan indicators may still have an effect on drug use 
because one can expect the more cost-sharing generous benefits to have slightly higher 
incremental effects on prescription drug use than the less generous plans. Therefore, if 
the 2SRI method has adequately adjusted for selection bias, the predicted residuals 
should be statistically insignificant, but the health plan indicators should be significant. 
The 2SRI-ZINB prescription drug results show that the health plan indicators were 
statistically significant (p<0.05) and the PPO Basic and Standard predicted residuals were 
statistically insignificant (p>0.05) (see Appendix 8). However, the PPO Plus predicted 
residual was statistically significant (p=0.047). These results imply that the IV technique 
may have been less effective in capturing self selection in the Plus plan than in the 
Standard and Basic plans.  Some slight bias may remain in the model. However, given 
that the Plus plan predicted residual was close to being statistically insignificant 
(p=0.047), the magnitude of bias does not appear to be large. One remedy to the bias 
would be to obtain additional data, such as the SEHP human resource files with other 
data elements on job ranking, salary and skill to identify a stronger instrumental variable.  
 
E. Discussion 
Health insurance plans have two primary ways of influencing how their members 
use health services: (1) utilization review (e.g., pre-authorization, gatekeeper models) and 
(2) OOP contribution requirements for accessing care (Feldstein, Wickizer, and Wheeler, 
1988; Rosenstein, 1991). This dissertation has explored the latter strategy, how OOP 
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cost-sharing requirements affect health services utilization and third-party payments, 
controlling for non-random selection.  
Based on the study results, our first policy conclusion is that North Carolina state 
policymaker may continue to observe highest service use amongst members enrolled in 
the lowest cost-sharing plan because the OOP costs disincentive to service use is 
attenuated under such a benefit design. The key post-results question is: What is it about 
the PPO Plus benefit design that makes the Plus plan have greater predicted utilization 
totals relative to other benefit options, even after controlling for non-random selection? 
One plausible explanation is that members’ price-sensitivity may be influencing their 
level of health care use.  By price sensitivity we mean the low OOP cost-sharing 
requirements of the Plus plan may make it such that there is no OOP disincentive for Plus 
plan members to judiciously consider their level of health service use. On the contrary, 
price sensitivity may be influencing member utilization in the other direction. For 
instance, members in the higher cost-sharing plans may actually want to consume as 
many services as the Plus plan enrollees, but the significantly higher coinsurance and 
deductible provisions may limit the amount of services they consume.  
Previous studies have proven that the type of health plan cost-sharing 
arrangement has a positive effect on the use of services and total expenditures. For 
instance, in the RAND Health Insurance Study, which explicitly controlled for selection 
bias through random assignment, persons in plans with low cost-sharing rates had twice 
the amount of annual health expenditures than persons with higher cost-sharing rates 
(Manning et al, 1987; Phelps and Newhouse, 1974).  If NC SEHP members respond to 
the Plus plan’s low cost-sharing requirements in a similar fashion as study participants 
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did in the low cost-sharing plans from the RAND Study; then one argument for the high 
third-party payment totals could be that when enrolled in the Plus plan, members use 
more services than they otherwise would use under a benefit with higher cost-sharing 
requirements.  
From a personal health perspective, the cost-sharing price-sensitivity effects on 
utilization could have broader implications around preventative care if members in the 
higher cost-sharing plans are less likely to seek necessary services as a result of the OOP 
cost of accessing care. Several employer-based insurance studies have documented the 
unintended consequences of having employees in high cost-sharing plans on the rate of 
preventative screenings and hospital admissions, compared to similar employees in the 
lower cost-sharing plans (Wharam et al, 2007; Wong et al, 2001; Rubin, Mendelson, and 
Rasell, 1995). Therefore, the broader implications of the lower predicted utilization totals 
in the Basic and Standard plans should be further explored in future work. Specifically, 
future work should determine if: (1) the lower predicted utilization totals in the Basic and 
Standard plans are positive outcomes because the plans contain excess health services 
utilization, without affecting members’ necessary care use. Or (2) if the lower predicted 
utilization totals in the Basic and Standard plans are negative outcomes because the 
designs’ limit members’ utilization to the point they become less likely to seek necessary 
care (e.g. preventative medicine).   
The second noted policy implication of this work is that the higher contracted 
reimbursement rates under the Indemnity plan, as opposed to the PPOs, may be explain 
why the Indemnity benefit had the second highest predicted third-party payment totals. 
The high predicted third-party payment totals in the Indemnity plan may not be a result of 
  83 
the Indemnity benefit design, but rather may be a result of the more generous contractual 
agreement with the network of providers. As stated earlier, the reimbursement rates for 
the same services are higher under the Indemnity plan than the PPO plans because the 
Indemnity plan does not have the discounted services that are contracted under the PPOs 
(SEHP, 2007).  For example, the NC General Assembly’s 2007 public report on benefit 
offerings states showed provides evidence that under the Indemnity plan, higher rates are 
paid to providers for services and thus, the state’s cost of coverage is higher under the 
Indemnity than the same services offered under the comparable PPO designs (SEHP, 
2007). The PPOs operated under a discounted reimbursement contract while the 
Indemnity plan continued to operate under the old, more generously reimbursable 
contracts. The Indemnity plan is an expensive form of provid ing coverage and may 
explain why the Indemnity design was associated with the second highest third-party 
payment totals, controlling for non-random plan selection. 
Another reason for the Indemnity’s higher predicted service use could be a result 
of the Indemnity plan having a lower cost-sharing mental health and substance abuse 
benefit. Many of the office visits associated with the Indemnity plan may have been visits 
to a behavioral health provider. We did not perform a separate sub analysis on the effect 
of benefit design on mental health and substance abuse visits because behavioral health 
services use was not the focus of this paper. The econometric model is controlling for 
bias arising from self-selection, so our argument is not that members with a mental health 
diagnosis likely make up the Indemnity membership and therefore are driving health care 
service use. Rather we are stating that the Indemnity plan is somewhat distinct from the 
PPO plans because it had a more generous mental health benefit. Therefore, when 
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considering reasons as to why predicted office use was the second highest under the 
Indemnity plan, one should consider that more office visits for behavioral health services 
may have occurred under the Indemnity plan.  
 
F. Methodological Limitations  
As seen in similar previous papers, estimates of the effect of benefit design on 
outcomes of use and costs that are not based on randomized experiments cannot 
definitively rule out the  possibility of selection bias (Liang, Phillips, and Wang, 2004; 
Tye et al. 2004). We address both the theoretical and applied aspects of the endogenous 
nature of health insurance in this paper. Theoretically, we explained that the relative cost-
sharing benefits associated with Plus plan enrollment could result in members with a 
frequent history of health services use being more likely to enroll in the Plus plan. As a 
remedy to the theorized endogeneity, we applied the 2SRI method to our estimation. The 
counterfactual test indicated that there was some slight bias remaining in the model after 
applying the 2SRI adjustment and that the remaining bias is likely occurring in the effect 
of the Plus plan. The fact that some selection bias does remain in the model should not 
taint the results or the quality of this work, because the impact of the bias appears to be 
minimal as indicated by the near statistical significance of the Plus plan predicted 
residual. Given the NC SEHP data elements and the exploration of previous methods 
used in similar retrospective studies, we argue our method for estimating the effect of 
benefit design in the face of endogeneity is empirically and statistically appropriate 
(Polsky and Nicholson, 1986; Parente, 2004; Terza et al. 2009). 
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In the estimation of benefit design on utilization and third-party payments, the 
proposed IV was the division of employment with the state.  The specification test for IV 
strength passed and provides some statistical justification for the employment divisions’ 
use. However, we recognize that the IV may be weak based on its strong theoretical 
assumption that underlying social similarities and dialogue between employees in the 
same occupational division may influence choice (Sorenson, 2006). The prescription drug 
counterfactual analysis revealed that the 2SRI approach does not fully control for 
selection bias, but this does not mean the IV was necessarily weak.  
There are several omitted data elements that would be particularly useful in our 
quest to identify alternative IV candidates, such as an indicator variable of whether the 
employee contacted a health benefit representative by phone during the open enrollment 
period. The logic behind this IV is that calls to a health benefit representative, regarding 
health plan questions for the upcoming coverage period, may affect plan choice. 
However, calling about a future health benefit should not have a direct effect on the 
outcomes since the member during the open enrollment period is still getting coverage 
under his/her old plan. The NC SEHP does monitor call volume to the health benefits 
toll- free number but does not link counts of calls to employees’ identification numbers.  
 As stated early in this paper, providers were reimbursed at a higher price per unit 
under the Indemnity plan than the PPOs. A limitation of the Indemnity third-party 
payment results is that we don’t have the ability to quantify how much greater the 
Indemnity reimbursement amount was relative to the PPO reimbursement. Such 
information would help us confirm that the higher third-party payment totals are a result 
of the level of services used and not the actual reimbursement price. For instance, if the 
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Indemnity plan hypothetically had the highest predicted third-party payment totals, but 
the lowest predicted utilization totals, then the disconnect between utilization level and 
total payments would likely be an indication that higher unit price, not utilization, was 
driving costs. The price information per service for the Indemnity and PPO plans that we 
would need reside in proprietary contracts held by the state that were not available to us.  
In short, we hypothesized, and now conclude, that when state employees are 
enrolled in one of four types of plans with the same network of providers and different 
cost-sharing requirements, the plan with the distinctly lower cost-sharing requirements 
will likely have the greatest utilization and cost totals, controlling for non-random 
selection. We also originally hypothesized that the plan with the second lowest cost-
sharing requirements would then follow suit and have the second greatest utilization and 
third-party payment totals. However, it appears that cost-sharing generosity doesn’t seem 
to have an effect on utilization and third-party payments, once one begins examining 
member totals in the less generous plans. Our original assumption was that Indemnity 
enrollees would have relatively low utilization totals because they would likely be more 
judicious in accessing care as a result of the higher OOP cost-sharing requirements.  
However, the benefit design results suggest that even if OOP cost-sharing is relatively 
high, members may still use as much care as those in the lowest OOP cost-sharing plan. 
This is certainly the case for the Indemnity benefit which had predicted inpatient and 
utilization totals close to, and often above, the Plus plan.  
Our work is applicable to employers considering increasing employees’ cost-
sharing amounts as a strategy to decrease employer spending and theoretically make 
employee’s more cost conscious when accessing care. Specifically, the study results 
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suggest that having employees enrolled in PPO plans with higher OOP cost-sharing 
requirements will likely result in lower employer payment totals. Additionally, the fact 
that utilization and third-party payment totals were the lowest in the plan (e.g. Basic plan) 
with the highest OOP cost-sharing requirements suggest that price sensitive behavior is 
exhibited.  If the Basic plan hypothetically had the highest utilization and third-party 
payment totals, controlling for non-random selection, then we would be concerned that 
state employees aren’t sensitive to OOP cost-sharing amounts when accessing care; but 
such is not the case in our study. Lastly, state policymakers should note that it’s not just 
the less healthy members in the more generous plans driving higher third-party payment 
totals. Instead, it is likely the lower OOP cost-sharing requirements that make high 
premium, low cost-sharing plan enrollees more willing to use care.  
 CHAPTER 4 
 
Policy Recommendations and Study Conclusions  
 
A. Implications for Future Research 
Looking forward, the state recognizes that many of their members have health 
conditions that cause them to be at high-risk (Milliman, 2009).  The state has decided to 
implement two programs to contain high-risk related costs: (1) a smoking cessation program 
and (2) a weight management program. Adopted by the Senate in 2009, the SB 287 bill 
establishes a “comprehensive wellness initiative” focusing on smoking cessat ion and weight 
management and outlining consequences of non-participation.  State employees who are 
smokers or are obese who do not participate in the management programs will not be 
permitted to enroll in the 90/10 plan (e.g. Standard plan) and instead will be relegated to the 
80/20, less generous plan (e.g. Basic plan) (NC Medical Society, 2009).  To date, the state 
has not released specific language describing how they will test and identify employees who 
are smokers or obese. As of January 1, 2011, all state employees defined as obese or as 
smokers will be required to participate in the wellness initiative program or else they will be 
assigned to the less generous cost-sharing health plan (i.e. PPO Basic).  
The NC SEHP should consider establishing a prospective study to evaluate the effect 
of the weight management program.  Of the two new programs, the weight management 
program should be evaluated because of the greater likelihood of observing short-term results 
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of member weight reduction, as opposed to short-term results of smoking cessation. 
Short-term effects associated with the smoking cessation intervention are difficult to observe. 
For instance, the smoking cessation trials literature states there is  little evidence that 
smoking cessation programs are directly associated with a reduction in mortality or health 
coverage cost savings (Anthonisen et al, 2005; Matthew et al, 2005).  
Methodologically, at a high- level, we recommend a two group pretest posttest design 
to examine the difference in the mean change in weight between the employees who were 
enrolled in the weight management program and those who were not as seen in Figure 11.  
Figure 11. Two Group Pretest Posttest Design 
Treatment Group
Control
Group
X
Pre-Period Weight      Weight Program Enrollment  Post-Period Weight
Treatment Group
Control
Group
Year 1                                                          Years 2 and 3
 
The treatment group would be employees who were clinically identified as obese and 
participated in the weight management program. The control group would be state employees 
who were clinically identified as obese, but did not participate in the program.  The pre-
period weight would be the average weight of the employee for 2010.  The post-period 
weight would be the average weight of the employee for 2011 and then for 2012.  Two years 
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of weight data post intervention would be necessary in order to observe a significant change 
in weight.   
The two group pre-post design is attractive because it does not require randomization. 
Assuming baseline equivalency between the two groups, if the decrease in average weight 
loss is greater in the treatment group than in the control group, then we may have evidence 
that the weight management program was effective. The disadvantages of using the study 
design are its weak external validity and that the preexisting differences in the groups may be 
confounded with treatment. In response to the external validity limitation, NC policymakers 
should be more concerned about how the findings are applicable to the NC SEHP population; 
therefore the generalizability of the study to other state health plans is of less concern. 
Although generalizability may not be of interest to NC policymakers, a researcher 
conducting the analysis would need to explore if such an analytical exercise would make a 
broader empirical contribution to the employer-sponsored insurance literature.  In response to 
the issue of self selection, various techniques such as propensity score matching or 
stratification (Dehejia and Sadek, 2002; Stuart and Rubin, 2007), could be applied to make sure 
the two groups are as equivalent as possible at baseline.  Although equivalence at baseline 
would not solve the issue of confounding, it would mitigate the extent of the selection bias.  
In short, the NC General Assembly is investing a substantial amount of funding into 
the wellness programs. Consequently, it would be desirable to implement a prospective study 
design to evaluate the effectiveness of the weight management intervention. Additional 
research planning steps the state should consider include: creating a state maintained table 
that documents program and non-program participants, developing a clinical strategy to 
obtain one weight reading in each year, and clearly describing the clinical criteria for obesity 
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and program inclusion.  The primary challenge to this proposed study will be getting enough 
members to obtain and submit their weight readings in order to have sufficient statistical 
power.  Employees identified as obese will be required to obtain weight readings in order to 
reenroll in the lower OOP cost plan. Therefore, we suspect that the opportunity for lower 
OOP coinsurance requirements may encourage a portion of population to enroll who 
otherwise would not have.   
 
B. Policy Recommendations  
In 2005, the NC State Employees and Teachers’ Health Plan faced two pressing 
concerns: (1) controlling the rising costs of providing coverage to its members and (2) 
offering employees more choice in health plans beyond the single Indemnity plan (SEHP, 
2007). In response to these concerns, the NC General Assembly and the NC SEHP office 
offered three new PPO options in 2006.  Our study objective was to examine the extent of 
adverse selection in state employees’ PPO plan choice and the subsequent effect of tiered 
PPO benefit design on total utilization and third-party payments. We have developed two 
data-driven recommendations from this study to inform future NC SEHP strategy and policy. 
The first recommendation is that NC state policymakers should expect total third-
party payments are expected to be greater in the current Standard plan than in the current 
Basic plan. The lowest predicted third-party payment totals occurred in the PPO Basic and 
Standard plans relative to the Indemnity plan, when controlling for non-random selection. 
These results suggest that enrollment in Basic and Standard plans are likely to reduce third-
party payments totals. In many ways the NC SEHP has already moved in the direction 
implied by our findings because the Indemnity and Plus plans are no longer offered by the 
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state and only the Basic and Standard plans remain.  The Indemnity plan was eliminated 
because it was considered an expensive form of coverage relative to the PPOs (SEHP, 2007). 
The old PPO Plus option was subsumed into an expanded PPO Standard plan.  
Of the two plans currently offered by the state, the Standard plan has the most 
generous benefit because it has lower cost-sharing requirements than the current Basic plan. 
Our study found that the most generous plan was associated with significantly higher 
predicted third-party totals for both members in poor and good health.  Assuming the results 
of our study are generalizable to the 2009 to 2010  NC SEHP membership, the current PPO 
Standard design is likely to have higher utilization and third-party payments than the current 
Basic plan because the Standard plan has the most generous cost-sharing benefit. Therefore, 
as the state earmarks funds to cover the costs of SEHP coverage, they should consider that 
total third-party payments on average are likely to be higher for members enrolled in the 
2009 to 2010 Standard Plan than for members enrolled in the 2009 to 2010 Basic plan.  
The second recommendation is that NC state policymakers should expect a 
significant amount of plan switching from the current PPO Standard plan into the current 
PPO Basic plan once the PPO premiums are increased for the 2010 to 2011 coverage period. 
The NC General Assembly voted to increase NC SEHP premiums starting in October of 
2010 by 8.9 percent in the Basic and Standard plans. We simulated the change in the 
probability of selection when OOP  premium is increased by 8.9 percent as an exercise for 
examining price-induced movement across plans using observational data. Results showed 
that when increasing the OOP Plus plan premium price, the probability of selecting the PPO 
Plus plan would decrease between 2% and 6% (p<0.05) for members enrolled in each family 
coverage option (e.g. employee plus spouse coverage, employee plus child coverage, etc). On 
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the contrary, an 8.9% increase in the premium price for the less generous PPO Basic and 
Standard plans had no effect on the probability of plan selection (p>0.05).  
These findings support the notion that state employees with family coverage are 
averse to increased premiums in the most generous plan, PPO Plus. When the Plus plan price 
increased, a portion of PPO Plus enrollees’ diverted to the Standard plan likely because the 
Standard plan was the next most generous benefit available. This is a situation where price 
sensitivity attenuates adverse selection because when the most generous plan is no longer 
attractive due to its higher premium price, then movement into the next most generous plan 
occurs. Based on our findings, when NC policymakers apply the premium increase to the 
2010 to 2011 PPO Basic and Standard plans, they should expect to see a number of members 
switch from the current Standard into the current Basic plan, but  few members are likely to 
swtich from the Basic to the Standard.  
 
C. Dissertation Conclusions 
The administration of the NC SEHP should consider our findings that describe how 
members respond when given a choice of benefits with varying levels of OOP cost-sharing 
requirements. Members who had a history of multiple hospital days or had a chronic 
condition were more likely to choose the most generous cost-sharing benefit than members 
who had no hospital admissions or no chronic condition diagnosis in the year p receding the 
plan selection. State employees appear to be more price sensitive to premium increases in the 
most generous cost-sharing plan and are likely to enroll in a less generous plan when the 
premium of the generous plan increases. But if premium increases in a less generous plan, 
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then members are less sensitive to price as seen in their low probability of switching to 
another plan. 
 Additionally, the most generous cost-sharing plan had the highest utilization and third-
party payment totals as originally hypothesized. However, the Indemnity plan, the plan with 
the third highest OOP cost-sharing requirements, had the second highest predicted utilization 
totals. This is not what was originally hypothesized. The fact that predicted total utilization 
was high in the moderately generous Indemnity plan suggests that members may have been 
more comfortable with the higher cost-sharing provisions (i.e. deductible, coinsurance), than 
they were with paying the high monthly premium under the Plus plan.  That is, while the 
OOP cost of accessing care is lower under the Plus plan, families in the Indemnity plan may 
still use care nearly as much as families enrolled in Plus plan because they spend less in OOP 
premiums and may be willing to put that difference toward OOP cost-sharing.   
In sum, increased employee cost-sharing has become a common strategy by employers to 
further share the total of cost of providing coverage (Gruber, 2009; Trivedi, Moloo, and Mor, 
2010). Our study shows that when examining a state employee insurance group with various 
PPO and Indemnity plans, the enrollees in the PPO plans with the highest cost-sharing 
requirements are significantly more likely to have the lowest utilization and cost totals.  From 
a short-term employer spending perspective, these outcomes may be of interest because they 
show that member enrollment in the higher cost-sharing PPO plans is likely to result in fewer 
employer dollars toward coverage. However, recent studies have shown that the unintended 
consequences of high cost sharing for inpatient and ambulatory visits may result in adverse 
health outcomes that subsequently increase total spending on health care in the long-term 
(Trivedi, Moloo, and Mor, 2010).  The challenge for employee benefit managers is to design 
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plans that offer low cost-sharing amounts for necessary preventative services (e.g. screening, 
annual physicals), but have higher cost-sharing amounts for services deemed clinically 
unnecessary. Listing different OOP requirements for a number of provider services  is what 
most benefit managers already do when creating an employee health plan, but identifying the 
numeric tipping-point where the cost-sharing affects member utilization is often difficult to 
achieve. As the NC SEHP continues to identify strategies to contain state spending and 
improve member health, a robust retrospective analysis should follow any health intervention 
or change in benefit design because such research, similar to this dissertation, can quantify 
the relationship between a policy change and members’ outcomes of interests.  
 
          Appendix 1. Description of ICD-9 Codes to Create Diagnosis Groups 
 
Diagnosis Group 
Name 
 
Corresponding ICD-9 Values 
that Comprise the Disease 
Group 
 
Description  
Diabetes ICD-9  249.0 to 250.9 Includes diagnoses for type I, type II, 
and secondary diabetes mellitus  
Hypertension ICD-9  401.05 to 405.11 Includes all diagnoses related to 
hypertension. The other term mostly 
commonly used for these set of codes is 
high blood pressure. It does not 
represent other diseases of the 
circulatory system such as acute 
myocardial infarction (AMI). Those 
with AMI are in the cardiovascular 
disease group.  
Cardiovascular 
Disease 
ICD-9 410 to 419, 428.0, 
429.2, 430 to 438, 745 to 747 
Cardiovascular disease (heart disease) 
represents diagnosed illnesses that 
come as a result of being at risk for 
coronary problems. Specifically, it 
includes congestive heart failure, 
stroke, and coronary artery disease 
(AMI).   
Mental Illness 
Indicator 
ICD-9  290.0 to 316.80 Includes all mental disorders such as 
schizophrenia, depression, and anxiety; 
as well as substance abuse diagnosis. 
Some classify mental health and 
substance abuse diagnoses as 
"behavioral health”, but we use the 
term “mental illness” to define all ICD 
290 to 316 diagnoses. 
Chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease 
(COPD)  
ICD-9 490 to 492, 494 to 
496 
Represent diagnosis related to chronic 
bronchitis and emphysema. ICD-9 
codes for asthma are not in this 
indicator. 
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Cancer ICD-9 172 to 173, 162.0 to 
162.9, 174 to 175, V10.3, 
185, 153.0 to 154.1, 188.0 to 
188.9, 201.0 to 201.9, 172,  
189, 208.9 
Represents the ten most frequently 
diagnosed cancers in the U.S.  in 2008 
(American Cancer Society, 2008). The 
cancers that make up the cancer 
indicator are as follows: nonmelanoma 
(skin cancer), lung, prostate, breast, 
colon and rectal, bladder, non-hodgkin 
lymphoma, melanoma, kidney, and 
leukemia. 
Back Pain ICD-9 724.0 to 724.8 Represents disorders of the back 
including commonly reported codes for 
thoracic spine pain, back pain, and 
backache.  
Non-back skeletal  ICD-9 710 to 723, 725 to 
739 
Represents diseases of the 
musculoskeletal system and connective 
tissues. Example includes arthritis, 
disorders of muscles, and curvature of 
spine.  
Asthma ICD-9 493.0 to 493.92 Includes diagnosis specifically related 
to asthma. It does not include diagnosis 
related to chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease (COPD).  
Epilepsy  ICD-9 345.0 to 345.8  Includes generalized nonconvulsive 
epilepsy and other forms of epilepsy 
like recurrent seizures.   
Disorders of the Eye ICD-9 360 to 389 Includes general problems with the eye 
and disorders associated with loss of 
visions. Common examples include 
redness of the eye and severe cases 
include diabetic retinopathy and 
glaucoma.  
Pregnancy ICD-9 V20 to V29 Includes pre and post care associated 
with pregnancy. Postpartum care for 
normal pregnancy as well as 
supervision of high-risk pregnancy is 
all included in the indicator.  
 98 
Chronic Liver 
Disease 
ICD-9 570 to 573, 50.5 Includes diagnosis for all liver disease 
including alcoholic liver disease, non-
alcoholic fatty liver disease, 
gallbladder, and hepatitis C. It also 
includes code for liver transplant (ICD- 
9 50.5). A member is only counted 
once for liver disease from either the 
diagnosis indicator or the liver 
transplant indicator. 
Other Diagnosed 
Conditions 
ICD-9 480 to 486, 770, E826 
to E829, E800 to E999, 
403.0 to 403.9, 585.1 to 
585.6, 327, 346.0 to 346.9, 
332.0 to 332.1 
Includes several diagnoses that appear 
in the data in less than 0.05% of the 
sample. Mostly representing migraines, 
road vehicle accidents, other accidents, 
sleep disorders and rare conditions such 
as Parkinson disease. (All codes cannot 
fit into second column, so full list of 
other diagnosis is available upon 
request).  
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Appendix 2. Regression Coefficients of Conditional Logit Choice Model with Bootstrapping  
 
Employee-Only 
Coverage 
 
 
N=176,010 
 Employee + 
Dependent 
Coverage 
 
N=40,475 
                               Variable 
 
Coefficients 
(Bootstrapped 
Std. Err.) 
Coefficients  
(Bootstrapped 
Std. Err.) 
                                 Premium   
Premium 
 
~ 
 
-0.011** 
(0.023) 
Basic Plan x Premium 
 ~ 
1.025* 
(0.071) 
Standard Plan x Premium 
 ~ 
1.713* 
(0.319) 
Plus plan x Premium 
 ~ 
0.930* 
(0.143) 
                         Inpatient Utilization     
Basic Plan x 0 total hospital days 
 
0.026* 
(0.012) 
   0.019** 
(0.004) 
Standard Plan x 0 total hospital days 
 
0.187* 
(0.034) 
0.062* 
(0.030) 
Plus Plan x 0 total hospital days 
 
0.093* 
(0.082) 
0.047* 
(0.016) 
Basic Plan x 1 to 2 total hospital days 
  
0.083* 
(0.004) 
0.021 
(0.040) 
Standard Plan x 1 to 2 total hospital days 
 
0.034* 
(0.019) 
0.032* 
(0.204) 
Plus Plan x 1 to 2 total hospital days  
 
-0.102* 
(0.048) 
-0.002* 
(0.048) 
Basic Plan x  3 or total hospital days 
 
-0.980 
(0.182) 
-0.210 
(0.011) 
Standard Plan x 3 or total hospital days 
 
-0.111* 
(0.093) 
-0.139 * 
(0.133) 
Plus Plan x 3 or total hospital days 
 
-0.843 
(0.009) 
-0.431* 
(0.028) 
Office Utilization   
Basic Plan x 0 Office Visits 
 
-0.568 
(0.087) 
-0.901 * 
(0.065) 
Standard Plan x 0 Office Visits 
 
0.515** 
(0.009) 
-0.114 
(0.140) 
Plus Plan x 0 Office Visits 
 
-0.731* 
(0.211) 
-0.712* 
(0.203) 
Basic Plan x 1 to 4 Office Visits -0.462* -0.578 
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 (0.113) (0.029) 
Standard Plan x 1 to 4 Office Visits 
 
-0.208* 
(0.061) 
-0.523 
(0.131) 
Plus Plan x 1 to 4 Office Visits 
 
0.648 
(0.139) 
-0.730 
(0.094) 
Basic Plan x 5 to 7 Office Visits 
 
0.328 
(0.140) 
-0.461* 
(0.070) 
Standard Plan x 5 to 7 Office Visits 
 
0.724* 
(0.032) 
-0.212* 
(0.052) 
Plus Plan x 5 to 7 Office Visits 
 
-0.335 
(0.012) 
0.653* 
(0.318) 
Basic Plan x 8 to 14 Office Visits 
 
-0.080** 
(0.037) 
-0.081 
(0.022) 
Standard Plan x  8 to 14 Office Visits 
 
0.601** 
(0.029) 
0.601* 
(0.105) 
Plus Plan x  8 to 14 Office Visits 
 
0.726* 
(0.086) 
0.731* 
(0.015) 
Basic Plan x 15 to 59 Office Visits 
 
-0.120* 
(0.063) 
0.122* 
(0.241) 
Standard Plan x  15 to 59 Office Visits 
 
0.040* 
(0.051) 
0.447 
(0.029) 
Plus Plan x  15 to 59 Office Visits 
 
1.609* 
(0.039) 
0.612* 
(0.132) 
Diagnosed Condition   
Basic Plan x Hypertension  
 
-0.642* 
(0.044) 
-0.439 
(0.173) 
Standard Plan x Hypertension  
 
0.092* 
(0.058) 
0.218 
(0.085) 
Plus Plan x Hypertension  
 
-0.253* 
(0.003) 
-0.015** 
(0.003) 
Basic Plan x Diabetes 
 
0.013 
(0.088) 
-0.642* 
(0.257) 
Standard Plan x Diabetes 
 
0.231* 
(0.041) 
0.092 
(0.034) 
Plus Plan x Diabetes 
 
0.009 
(0.022) 
-0.25* 
(0.041) 
Basic Plan x Mental Illness Indicator 
 
-0.094* 
(0.042) 
0.039 
(0.029) 
Standard Plan x Mental Illness Indicator 
 
-0.012* 
(0.077) 
0.231* 
(0.031) 
Plus Plan x Mental Illness Indicator 
 
-0.135 
(0.023) 
0.010** 
(0.092) 
Basic Plan x Back Pain 
 
-0.243* 
(0.005) 
-0.097* 
(0.031) 
Standard Plan x Back Pain 
 
-0.028 
(0.131) 
-0.0128 
(0.041) 
 101 
Plus Plan x Back Pain 
 
-0.075* 
(0.019) 
-0.141 
(0.017) 
Basic Plan x Asthma 
 
-0.437* 
(0.053) 
-0.321* 
(0.076) 
Standard Plan x Asthma 
 
-0.425* 
(0.065) 
-0.294* 
(0.071) 
Plus Plan x Asthma 
 
-0.223* 
(0.085) 
-0.306* 
(0.064) 
Basic Plan x Non-back skeletal 
 
0.133 
(0.104) 
-0.056 
(0.035) 
Standard Plan x Non-back skeletal 
 
0.092* 
(0.021) 
0.028* 
(0.027) 
Plus Plan x Non-back skeletal 
 
0.084 
(0.039) 
-0.113 
(0.082) 
Basic Plan x COPD 
 
0.035* 
(0.021) 
0.145* 
(0.043) 
Standard Plan x COPD 
 
0.058** 
(0.037) 
0.914* 
(0.116) 
Plus Plan x COPD 
 
0.145 
(0.025) 
0.749* 
(0.055) 
Basic Plan x Cancer 
 
-0.573* 
(0.056) 
-0.282* 
(0.400) 
Standard Plan x Cancer 
 
0.129** 
(0.011) 
0.239* 
(0.262) 
Plus Plan x Cancer 
 
0.340* 
(0.178) 
0.563* 
(0.261) 
Basic Plan x Cardiovascular 
 
0.148* 
(0.089) 
0.322** 
(0.056) 
Standard Plan x Cardiovascular 
 
-0.027* 
(0.058) 
0.388* 
(0.058) 
Plus Plan x Cardiovascular 
 
0.012* 
(0.060) 
0.541* 
(0.152) 
Basic Plan x Epilepsy 
 
-0.416** 
(0.053) 
-0.166** 
(0.083) 
Standard Plan x Epilepsy  
 
-0.437* 
(0.078) 
-0.232* 
(0.078) 
Plus Plan x Epilepsy 
 
-0.141* 
(0.093) 
0.034* 
(0.115) 
Basic Plan x Other Conditions 
 
-0.101* 
(0.050) 
-0.171** 
(0.029) 
Standard Plan x Other Conditions 
 
-0.091* 
(0.029) 
-0.437* 
(0.016) 
Plus Plan x Other Conditions  
 
-0.023* 
(0.014) 
-0.771* 
(0.028) 
Basic Plan x Disorders of the Eye 
 
0.142 
(0.103) 
0.062* 
(0.035) 
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Standard Plan x Disorders of the Eye 
 
0.093* 
(0.021) 
0.028* 
(0.061) 
Plus Plan x Disorders of the Eye 
 
0.013* 
(0.024) 
0.072* 
(0.054) 
Basic Plan x Pregnancy 
 
0.044* 
(0.1150 
0.170* 
(0.032) 
Standard Plan x Pregnancy 
 
0.106 
(0.050) 
0.042 
(0.019) 
Plus Plan x Pregnancy 
 
0.089** 
(0.029) 
0.057* 
(0.037) 
Basic Plan x Chronic Liver Disease 
 
-0.452* 
(0.052) 
-0.319* 
(0.070) 
Standard Plan x Chronic Liver Disease 
 
-0.340* 
(0.076) 
-0.213* 
(0.085) 
Plus Plan x Chronic Liver Disease 
 
-0.411* 
(0.065) 
-0.142* 
(0.010) 
Medium Household Income   
Basic Plan x $31,001 to 40,000 MHI  
 
-0.442* 
(0.064) 
-0.247* 
(0.092) 
Standard Plan  x $31,001 to 40,000 MHI  
 
-0.310* 
(0.102) 
-0.031* 
(0.046) 
Plus Plan x $31,001 to 40,000 MHI  
 
-0.091* 
(0.038) 
-0.088* 
(0.171) 
Basic Plan x $40,001 to $55,000 MHI  
 
-0.068* 
(0.004) 
-0.364 
(0.122) 
Standard Plan x  $40,001 to $55,000 MHI 
  
0.190** 
(0.007) 
-0.085* 
(0.024) 
Plus Plan x  $40,001 to $55,000 MHI  
 
-0.020 
(0.039) 
-0.019* 
(0.040) 
Basic Plan x $55,001 to $98,000 MHI 
 
-0.024 
(0.031) 
-0.414 
(0.279) 
Standard Plan x  $55,001 to $98,000 MHI 
 
0.059** 
(0.073) 
-0.313* 
(0.077) 
Plus Plan x  $55,001 to $98,000 MHI 
 
0.221* 
(0.074) 
-0.092* 
(0.057) 
Basic Plan x $98,001 or More MHI 
 
0.002 
(0.013) 
-0.071 
(0.117) 
Standard Plan x  $98,001 or More MHI 
 
0.197* 
(0.401) 
-0.192* 
(0.049) 
Plus Plan x  $98,001 or More MHI 
 
0.112 
(0.033) 
0.236** 
(0.147) 
Dependent Coverage Type   
Basic Plan x Employee and Spouse Coverage 
 
~ 
 
-0.021* 
(0.030) 
Standard Plan x Employee and Spouse Coverage 
 ~ 
0.061 
(0.019) 
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Plus Plan x Employee and Spouse Coverage 
 ~ 
0.221* 
(0.087) 
Basic Plan x Employee and Child Coverage 
 ~ 
0.001 
(0.029) 
Standard Plan x Employee and Child Coverage 
 ~ 
0.203** 
(0.172) 
Plus Plan x Employee and Child Coverage 
 ~ 
0.113* 
(0.014) 
Basic Plan x Employee and Family Coverage 
 ~ 
-0.13 
(0.002) 
Standard Plan x Employee and Family Coverage 
 ~ 
-0.091* 
(0.062) 
Plus Plan x Employee and Family Coverage 
 ~ 
-0.161 
(0.041) 
Age   
Basic Plan x Age 
 
-0.146* 
(0.201) 
~ 
 
Standard Plan x Age 
 
-0.329* 
(0.415) ~ 
Plus Plan x Age 
 
-0.253* 
(0.163) ~ 
Basic Plan x Age-Squared 
 
-0.031* 
(0.199) ~ 
Standard Plan x Age-Squared 
 
-0.172* 
(0.238) ~ 
Plus Plan x Age-Squared 
 
-0.732 
(0.512) ~ 
Psuedo R2 0.371 0.412 
Log- likelihood Value -15913.4 -15642.1 
*Significant at p<0.05 **Significant at p<0.01 Note: Bootstrapped standard errors (BSEs) are reported.  
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Appendix 3. Post-PPO Distribution of Total Hospital Days Per Member 
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Appendix 4. Post-PPO Distribution of Total Office Visits Per Member 
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Appendix 5. 2SRI-ZINB Model Coefficients for the Effect of Benefit Design on Total 
Office Use 
  
Employee-Only  
Population 
 
Employee + Dependents 
Population 
Number of families 176,010 40,475 
Log Likelihood -21,794 -21,542 
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 
Health Plan Indicators   
PPO Basic Plan   
 
-0.64** 
(0.19) 
-0.71** 
(0.03) 
PPO Stan Plan  
 
    -0.37** 
(0.07) 
-1.23** 
(0.01) 
PPO Plus Plan  
 
    0.26** 
(0.02) 
0.84** 
(0.03) 
PPO Basic Predicted Residual 
 
   -0.90 ** 
(0.01) 
-1.01** 
(0.01) 
PPO Standard Predicted Residual 
 
   -1.58** 
(0.41) 
0.49** 
(0.25) 
PPO Plus Predicted Residual 
 
   0.96** 
(0.02) 
2.45** 
(0.04) 
Utilization Measures   
Total Inpatient Days 1 to 2 
 
    0.12** 
(0.02) 
0.27** 
(0.01) 
Total Inpatient Days 3 or More 
 
    0.17** 
(0.03) 
-0.98* 
(0.06) 
Diagnosis Indicators   
Hypertension 
 
   -0.31** 
(0.12) 
-0.79* 
(0.03) 
Diabetes 
 
   0.38** 
(0.07) 
1.63** 
(0.09) 
Mental Illness 
 
   0.16** 
(0.01) 
0.26** 
(0.06) 
Back Pain 
 
   0.10** 
(0.02) 
0.21* 
(0.01) 
Cardiovascular 
 
  0.73* 
(0.05) 
0.94* 
(0.08) 
Non-back Skeletal 
 
    0.34** 
(0.01) 
0.54* 
(0.12) 
COPD 
 
-0.06** 
(0.04) 
-0.30* 
(0.01) 
Cancer 
 
0.42** 
(0.02) 
0.57** 
(0.17) 
Asthma 
 
0.71 
(0.14) 
0.12 
(0.06) 
Epilepsy 0.07** 0.83** 
 106 
(0.02) (0.03) 
Other Conditions 
 
0.28* 
(0.01) 
0.75** 
(0.05) 
Disorder of the Eye 
 
-0.06** 
(0.04) 
-0.16** 
(0.10) 
Pregnancy 
 
0.16 
(0.02) 
0.85 
(0.09) 
Chronic Liver Disease 
 
0.37** 
(0.01) 
0.49** 
(0.02) 
Other Diagnosis 
 
0.21* 
(0.01) 
0.42 
(0.03) 
Socio-demographic Measures   
Age 
 
   0.14** 
(0.03) 
  0.39** 
(0.12) 
Age-Squared 
 
   0.84** 
(0.06) 
  0.29** 
(0.02 ) 
Male 
 
    0.53** 
(0.09) 
  0.35** 
(0.13) 
MHI $18k to $30k 
 
-0.47 
(0.06) 
-0.74 
(0.01) 
MHI $31k to $50k (referent) 
 
~ 
 
~ 
 
MHI $51k to $99k 
 
0. 19** 
(0.02) 
0.39** 
(0.07) 
MHI $99k < 
 
0.55** 
(0.14) 
1.72** 
(0.03) 
Employee + Spouse Coverage (referent) 
 
~ 
 
~ 
 
Employee + Children Coverage 
 
~ 
 
 
0.78* 
(0.25) 
 
Employee + Spouse + Children Coverage 
 
~ 
 
0.33* 
(0.08) 
Family Size of 2 (referent) 
~ 
 
~ 
 
Family Size of 3 
~ 
 
-0.58 
(0.01) 
 
Family Size of 4 or More ~ 
0.46* 
(0.22) 
prob0 0.2057 0.2137 
 
% of employees w/ zero OP visits 0.2419 0.2419 
   * Statistically significant at 5% level. **Statistically significant at 1% level.  Bootstrapped standard errors are   
   in parentheses.  
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Appendix 6. 2SRI-ZINB Model Coefficients for the Effect of Benefit Design on Total 
Hospital Days 
 
Employee-Only  
Sample 
 
Employee + Dependents 
Sample 
Number of Families 176,010 40,475 
Log Likelihood -23,225.8 -23,109.1 
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 
Health Plan Indicators   
PPO Basic Plan   
 
-0.19** 
(0.12) 
-0.44* 
(0.09) 
PPO Stan Plan  
 
-0.23** 
(0.05) 
-0.86* 
(0.29) 
PPO Plus Plan  
 
0.03**  
(0.01) 
1.37*  
(0.34) 
PPO Basic Predicted Residual 
 
-1.90 ** 
(0.56) 
-1.01** 
(0.31) 
PPO Standard Predicted Residual 
 
-1.07** 
(0.22) 
-2.35** 
(0.42) 
PPO Plus Predicted Residual 
 
0.38** 
(0.51) 
0.07* 
(0.01) 
Utilization Measures   
Total Office Visits Zero 
 
-0.12** 
(0.04) 
-0.69* 
(0.16) 
Total Office Visits 1 to 4 
 
0.17** 
(0.03) 
1.15** 
(0.20) 
Total Office Visits 5 to 14 
 
1.25* 
(0.06) 
0.32* 
(0.01) 
Total Office Visits 15 to 30 
 
0.31** 
(0.09) 
0.11** 
(0.01) 
Diagnosis Indicators   
Mental Illness 
 
0.16** 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.01) 
Back Pain 
 
0.10** 
(0.05) 
0.22 
(0.01) 
Cardiovascular 
 
0.73* 
(0.29) 
-0.10** 
(0.04) 
Non-back Skeletal 
 
0.34** 
(0.02) 
-0.43** 
(0.27) 
COPD 
 
-0.06** 
(0.01) 
0.06* 
(0.01) 
Cancer 
 
0.42** 
(0.31) 
-1.22** 
(0.04) 
Asthma 
 
0.71 
(0.55) 
0.09* 
(0.01) 
Epilepsy 0.07** 0.33** 
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 (0.02) (0.08) 
Other Conditions 
 
0.28* 
(0.11) 
0.43* 
(0.12) 
Disorder of the Eye 
 
-0.06** 
(0.01) 
0.05* 
(0.02) 
Pregnancy 
 
0.16 
(0.13) 
-1.56* 
(0.81) 
Chronic Liver Disease 
 
0.37** 
(0.04) 
-0.15** 
(0.11) 
Other Diagnosis 
 
0.21* 
(0.01) 
-0.67** 
(0.03) 
Socio-demographic Measures   
Age 
 
0.11** 
(0.02) 
0.26** 
(0.01) 
Age-Squared 
 
1.35** 
(0.71) 
0.08* 
(0.02) 
Male 
 
0.53** 
(0.32) 
0.62* 
(0.28) 
MHI $18k to $30k 
 
-0.47 
(0.25) 
0.41 
(0.36) 
MHI $31k to $50k (referent) 
 
~ 
 
~ 
 
MHI $51k to $99k 
 
0. 19** 
(0.02) 
-0.03** 
(0.32) 
MHI $99k < 
 
0.55** 
(0.08) 
0.29* 
(0.01) 
Employee + Spouse Coverage (referent) ~ ~ 
Employee + Children Coverage 
 
~ 
 
0.62* 
(0.19) 
Employee + Spouse + Children Coverage 
 
 
~ 
 
1.73* 
(0.62) 
Family Size of 2  (referent) 
 
~ 
 
~ 
 
Family Size of 3 
 
~ 
 
0.46* 
(0.01) 
 
Family Size of 4 or More 
 ~ 
0.90** 
(0.23) 
Probability of zero hospital days 0.7716 0.7983 
 
% of families with zero hospital days 0.8407 0.8407 
  * Statistically significant at 5% level. **Statistically significant at 1% level.  Bootstrapped standard errors are in 
parentheses.  
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    Appendix 7. Two-Part Model Coefficients of the PPO Plans’ Effect on Third-Party Payments  
  
2SRI-LPM  
 
2SRI-OLS model, 
unlogged 
Number of Families 216,485 213,455 
Prob > F 0.00 0.00 
R-squared 0.191 0.174 
Health Plan Indicators   
PPO Basic Plan 
 
-0.61** 
(0.07) 
-143.26**  
(39.57) 
PPO Standard Plan 
 
-0.08*  
(0.02) 
-27.14*  
(6.70) 
PPO Plus Plan 
 
0.33*  
(0.01) 
   451.23**  
(25.41) 
PPO Basic Plan  Predicted Residual 
 
-1.12* 
 (0.04) 
-59.10*  
(8.59) 
PPO Stan Plan Predicted Residual 
 
-0.53* 
 (0.17) 
60.23*  
(5.29) 
PPO Plus Plan Predicted Residual 
 
0.82* 
(0.04) 
274.90*  
(16.31) 
Utilization Measures   
Total Office Visits Zero 
0.07*  
(0.01) 
-53.60*  
(4.72) 
Total Office Visits 1 to 4 
 
0.16*  
(0.03) 
  76.22** 
 (9.38) 
Total Office Visits 5 to 14 (referent) 
 
~ 
 
~ 
 
Total Office Visits 15 to 30 
 
0.17*  
(0.01) 
458.02* 
(33.57) 
Total Office Visits 31 or More 
 
1.38*  
(0.12) 
1,662** 
(13.94) 
Total Hospital Days 0 (referent) 
 
~ 
 
~ 
 
Total Inpatient Days 1 to 2 
 
0.21  
(0.04) 
671.27*  
(22.83) 
Total Inpatient Days 3 or More 
 
0.32*  
(0.20) 
1,295.25* 
(43.60) 
Diagnosis Indicators   
Hypertension 
 
0.78*  
(0.19) 
803.75**  
(36.42) 
Diabetes 
 
0.31* 
 (0.54) 
200.26** 
 (27.18) 
Mental Illness 
 
0.03*  
(0.01) 
312.29* 
 (45.05) 
Back Pain 
 
0.84*  
(0.12) 
249.15* 
 (8.63) 
Cardiovascular Disease 0.66**  415.83**  
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 (0.19) (66.54) 
Non-back Skeletal 
 
0.07  
(0.01) 
81.33* 
 (17.01) 
Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease 
 
0.49**  
(0.26) 
582.47*  
(32.18) 
Cancer 
 
0.10* 
 (0.08) 
1,301.97* 
(58.42) 
Asthma 
 
-0.37*  
(0.25) 
-835.60*  
(138.64) 
Epilepsy 
 
0.10* 
 (0.01) 
-153.29 
(19.53) 
Disorders of the Eye 
 
0.08 
 (0.02) 
311.06*  
(42.13) 
Pregnancy 
 
  0.34**  
(0.13) 
    569.51**  
 (19.32) 
Chronic Liver Disease 
0.15  
(0.02) 
 -409.75* 
    (97.29) 
Other Conditions  
0.57* 
 (0.23) 
44.38* 
 (6.22) 
Socio-demographic Measures   
Age 
 
0.45**  
(0.09) 
203.82** 
(15.46) 
Age-Squared 
 
0.6* 
 (0.01) 
  89.34** 
(3.51) 
Male 
 
   0.26**  
(0.01) 
129.66** 
(3.11) 
MHI 18k to 30k 
 
-0.06*  
(0.02) 
-398.39 
(38.25) 
MHI 31k to 50k (referent) 
 
~ 
 
~ 
 
MHI 51k to 99k 
 
0.59* 
 (0.03) 
197.44*  
(12.16) 
MHI 100k or more 
 
-0.22** 
(0.01) 
-321.49*  
(16.81) 
* Statistically significant at 5% level. **Statistically significant at 1% level.  Bootstrapped standard errors of 
1,000 iterations are in parentheses.  
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Appendix 8. 2SRI-ZINB Model Coefficients for the Effect of Benefit Design on Prescription 
Use 
 Model Fit Value 
Number of obs 176,010 
Log Likelihood -25249 
Prob > chi2 0.00 
Health Plan Indicators  
PPO Basic Plan  
 
                             -0.37* 
(0.06) 
PPO Stan Plan  
 
                             0.21* 
 (0.02) 
PPO Plus Plan  
 
   0.59** 
(0.01) 
PPO Basic Predicted  Residual 
 
-0.61 
(0.26) 
PPO Standard Predicted Residual 
 
-0.18 
(0.13) 
PPO Plus Predicted Residual 
 
0.44* 
(0.07) 
Health Services Use Measures   
Total Office Visits Zero 
 
0.43* 
(0.11) 
Total Office Visits 1 to 4 
 
0.59** 
(0.01) 
Total Office Visits 15 to 30 
 
0.63* 
(0.49) 
Total Office Visits 31 or More 
 
0.29* 
(0.15) 
Total Inpatient Days 1 to 2 
 
0.14* 
(0.20) 
Total Inpatient Days 3 or More 
 
0.29* 
(0.03) 
Prior Year Diagnosis Indicators  
Hypertension 
 
0.38* 
(0.23) 
Diabetes 
 
0.44* 
(0.15) 
Mental Illness 
 
0.26** 
(0.18) 
Back Pain 
 
0.47* 
(0.19) 
Cardiovascular Disease 
 
0.15* 
(0.01) 
Non-back Skeletal 
 
0.84** 
(0.23) 
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Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary 
Disease (COPD) 
1.27** 
(0.92) 
Cancer 
 
0.12* 
(0.08) 
Asthma 
 
0.45* 
(0.14) 
Epilepsy 
 
0.91* 
(0.64) 
Disorders of the Eye 
 
0.52** 
(0.33) 
Pregnancy 
 
0.14** 
(0.11) 
Chronic Liver Disease 
 
0.29* 
(0.17) 
Other Conditions  
 
0.58* 
(0.31) 
Socio-demographic Covariates  
Age 
 
0.29* 
(0.15) 
Age-Squared 
 
0.02** 
(0.01) 
Male 
 
0.73** 
(0.26) 
MHI 18k to 30k 
 
0.15* 
(0.01) 
MHI 31k to 50k (referent) 
 
~ 
 
MHI 51k to 99k 
 
0.43* 
(0.31) 
MHI 100k or more 
 
0.10 
(0.04) 
  * Statistically significant at 5% level. **Statistically significant at 1% level. Bootstrapped standard                      
errors in parentheses.  
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